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ABSTRACT 
This project examines the ongoing debate over internet content discrimination, 
more commonly referred to as network neutrality. It offers a new approach to 
examining this issue by combining a critical, political economy approach with Lawrence 
Lessig’s four modalities of regulation: policy, architecture, markets, and norms. It 
presents a critical, comparative case study analysis of how architecture, markets and 
norms have shaped United States policy along with comparative examples from select 
international case studies facing similar regulatory issues. Its findings suggest that 
while each of the four modalities plays a significant role in the regulation and 
persistence of network neutrality, there is a need for more clear, robust policy measures 
to address content discrimination online. Based on these analyses, the author offers 
policy recommendations for future network neutrality regulation. 
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1     INTRODUCTION  
On January 14, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ended the 
U.S. Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) latest attempt to enforce Network 
Neutrality (NN), a principle that urged network providers to treat all digital content equally.1 
The FCC’s rejected policy, the 2010 Open Internet Order, mandated providers disclose their 
network management practices and prohibited blocking or discriminating against lawful 
content on their networks.2  
The court’s ruling in favor of communications giant Verizon was based primarily on the 
FCC’s previous classification of internet services as different from and therefore not held to the 
same standards as telecommunication services (e.g. telephone) and therefore not held to the 
same standards.3 Because of historical threats from monopolistic abuse at the hands of 
providers like AT&T, many previous communication services were protected as common 
carriers for nearly a century.4 The principle of common carriage (with a history stretching as far 
back as ancient Rome) refers to the obligation of transportation information networks serving a 
vital connecting role in society to treat content equally.5 But despite travelling on the same or 
similar infrastructure as telephone, network owners have argued information services like the 
internet be considered different, which, in practice means less oversight and more opportunities 
for abuse. As internet protocol services, content, and networks increasingly play a central role in 
modern society the equal transportation of information across these networks must be insured, 
either by legal rulemaking or through other means of regulation.  
                                                1	  Wyatt,	  “Rebuffing	  F.C.C.	  in	  ‘Net	  Neutrality’	  Case,	  Court	  Allows	  Streaming	  Deals.”	  2	  Federal	  Communications	  Commission,	  In	  the	  Matter	  of	  Preserving	  the	  Open	  Internet	  
Broadband	  Industry	  Practices.	  3	  “Sender-Side Transmission Rules for the Internet.”	  4	  Wu,	  The	  Master	  Switch:	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Information	  Empires.	  5	  Ibid.;	  Marsden,	  Net	  Neutrality.	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In the wake of the 2014 ruling, NN supporters have been eager to cast blame for the 
issue’s lack of support. Neutrality advocates have criticized the FCC’s piecemeal approach, the 
consolidation of the telecommunications and media industries, and a lack of political attention 
paid to internet issues in general.6 Meanwhile, the FCC led by chairman Tom Wheeler has 
worked to outline a revised set of policies to guide the FCC’s enforcing of an “open internet.” 
With the FCC’s previous policy invalidated and the status of network neutrality in limbo, the 
need for examining the issue and potential policy directions is greater than ever.  
In this pursuit, I will argue the need for network neutrality, describe its major 
participants and acknowledge the major works examining the topic so far. This chapter includes 
offers a theoretical lens for examining now network neutrality is regulated as well as the 
purpose and methodological design for this project in general. Finally, it includes a guide to the 
subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
1.1 The need for neutrality 
While feckless FCC policies and the powerful financial lobbying and political influence 
of network owners have drawn much of the blame for the weakening of network neutrality in 
the U.S., the historical, commercial, technological, and social factors surrounding the issue have 
arguably played a larger role in the current state of network discrimination both in the U.S. and 
around the world.   
Access to communication and information networks offers individuals powerful 
opportunities to contribute and participate in public life. The concept of network neutrality is 
designed to protect these opportunities.7 The internet offers shortcuts to people and ideas from 
around the world while also bridging previously immense distances between those in power 
                                                6	  Patel,	  “The	  Wrong	  Words”;	  Herrman,	  “Welcome	  To	  The	  Net	  Neutrality	  Nightmare	  Scenario.”	  7	  Zittrain,	  Net	  Neutrality	  as	  Diplomacy,	  23;	  Nunziato,	  Virtual	  Freedom;	  Benkler,	  The	  Wealth	  
of	  Networks.	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and the rest of the public.8 The public’s ability to share information and data offers 
opportunities to cultivate public discourse and share information, however network operators 
have continued to seek control over whom and what can be transmitted across the internet. 
Recently, a tenuous balance of policies and other mechanisms has existed to preserve access and 
equal treatment online. The 2014 Verizon ruling is just one demonstration of the frailty of 
network neutrality policies in the U.S. As these regulatory means are weakened, there is a need 
for more robust and effective policies to protect neutrality.   
In this project, I examine how the markets, laws and architecture of the internet have 
failed to maintain a reasonable level of network neutrality in the U.S. By highlighting these 
failures in contrast to other approaches to net neutrality from around the world, I argue for 
more robust policy principles to address fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory information 
carriage across the web moving forward. 
1.1.1  What is Network Neutrality specifically? 
Network Neutrality’s broad significance and complex nature has attracted scholarly 
attention from a wide range of fields including: communication, media, law, economics and 
computer science.  Law professors Mark Lemley and Lawrence Lessig introduced the concept of 
non-discrimination for digital computing networks in 2000.9 They argued, the “end to end” 
(e2e) design of the internet, in which information moves between users and without 
interference from network providers was vital to innovation.10  
The term “Network Neutrality,” first coined by legal scholar Tim Wu in 2003, builds on 
this foundation and the most basic sense describes the principle of preventing of digital content 
and service discrimination by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and other network owners 
                                                8	  Kelty,	  “From	  Participation	  to	  Power.”	  9	  Lemley	  and	  Lessig,	  “The	  End	  of	  End-­‐to-­‐End.”	  10	  Ibid.,	  5–7.	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across mass digital networks – namely, what is popularly considered the internet.11 Legal 
scholar Christopher Marsden’s 2010 Net Neutrality: Towards a Co-Regulatory Solution intervenes 
in the debate by offering an approach to neutrality that reconciles the industrial and political 
differences over the issue of neutrality.12 Other significant legal scholarly contributions include 
those by Barbara Van Schewick, Eli Noam, Jonathan Zittrain, and others who have argued for 
NN based on its economic feasibility, the structural/industrial conditions which have led to its 
emergence and neutrality’s implications for speech and information diplomacy respectively.13 
Some scholars, including Robert Hahn and Scott Wallsten, Jay Choi and Byung-Cheol Kim and 
Nicholas Economides and Joacim Tåg, focus on economic analyses offering descriptive and 
hypothetical modeling of the implications of neutrality.14 Another strand of research focuses on 
the technical and infrastructural dynamics of neutrality, including: examinations of the 
technical means of data management by Milton Mueller, the technical feasibility of neutrality by 
Jon Crowcroft, and an in-depth investigation of the underlying protocols which make internet 
traffic possible by Fenwick McKelvey among others.15 
There have been some investigations analyzing and comparing intentional approaches 
to the issue, such as those by Wallsten and Stephanie Hausladen, comparing the status of 
neutrality in a handful of example countries.16 Marsden as well as Pietro Crocioni and Martin 
                                                11	  Wu,	  “Network	  Neutrality,	  Broadband	  Discrimination,”	  20.	  12	  Marsden,	  Net	  Neutrality.	  13	  Van	  Schewick,	  Towards	  an	  Economic	  Framework	  for	  Network	  Neutrality	  Regulation;	  Eli	  M.	  Noam,	  “Regulation	  3.0	  for	  Telecom	  3.0”;	  Noam,	  “Beyond	  Net	  Neutrality”;	  Zittrain,	  Net	  
Neutrality	  as	  Diplomacy;	  Zittrain,	  “What	  Matters	  in	  Net	  Neutrality.”	  14	  Hahn	  and	  Wallsten,	  “The	  Economics	  of	  Net	  Neutrality”;	  Choi	  and	  Kim,	  “Net	  Neutrality	  and	  Investment	  Incentives”;	  Economides	  and	  Tåg,	  “Network	  Neutrality	  on	  the	  Internet.”	  15	  Mueller	  and	  Asghari,	  “Deep	  Packet	  Inspection	  and	  Bandwidth	  Management”;	  Crowcroft,	  “Net	  Neutrality”;	  Pouwelse	  et	  al.,	  “Pirates	  and	  Samaritans”;	  Moustafa	  and	  Zeadally,	  Media	  
Networks	  Architectures,	  Applications,	  and	  Standards;	  McKelvey,	  “Ends	  and	  Ways.”	  16	  Wallsten	  and	  Hausladen,	  “Net	  Neutrality,	  Unbundling,	  and	  Their	  Effects	  on	  International	  Investment	  in	  Next-­‐Generation	  Networks.”	  
16 
Cave have highlighted some of the neutrality conditions in the European Union, while Jeffrey 
Blevins and Leslie Shade compared the US neutrality conditions to those in Canada.17 John 
Stevenson and Andrew Clement performed a comparative policy analysis between Japan, the 
European Union, the US, and Canada.18 
While the majority of scholars appear either neutral or in favor of network neutrality, 
the literature includes some scholarly detractors. Most notably, this group includes legal scholar 
Christopher Yoo who has argued against the issue on the basis of its technical infeasibility, 
industrial pressure and unnecessary intervention.19 Adam Thierer has argued the neutrality 
debate may be an example of regulatory overreach, which threatens the innovation of 
networks.20 Other arguments against network neutrality policies or interventions include a 
comparison to broadcast licenses by Richard Epstein and an overview of regulatory trends in 
comparison to neutrality by Weisman and Robinson.21 Some, like Robert Zelnick and Eva 
Zelnick have suggested temporary network neutrality policies may endanger the long-term 
feasibility of the internet itself.22 
                                                17	  Cave	  and	  Crocioni,	  “Does	  Europe	  Need	  Network	  Neutrality	  Rules?”;	  Crocioni,	  “Net	  Neutrality	  in	  Europe”;	  Blevins	  and	  Shade,	  “Editorial.”	  18	  Stevenson	  and	  Clement,	  “Regulatory	  Lessons	  for	  Internet	  Traffic	  Management	  from	  Japan,	  the	  European	  Union,	  and	  the	  United	  States.”	  19	  Yoo,	  “Network	  Neutrality	  after	  Comcast:	  Toward	  a	  Case-­‐by-­‐Case	  Approach	  to	  Reasonable	  Network	  Management”;	  Yoo,	  “Is	  There	  a	  Role	  for	  Common	  Carriage	  in	  an	  Internet-­‐Based	  World?”;	  Wu	  and	  Yoo,	  “Keeping	  the	  Internet	  Neutral?”;	  Yoo,	  “Network	  Neutrality	  after	  Comcast:	  Toward	  a	  Case-­‐by-­‐Case	  Approach	  to	  Reasonable	  Network	  Management.”	  20	  Thierer,	  “‘Net	  Neutrality’	  Digital	  Discrimination	  or	  Regulatory	  Gamesmanship	  in	  Cyberspace?”;	  Thierer,	  “Are	  Dumb	  Pipe	  Mandates	  Smart	  Public	  Policy	  -­‐	  Vertical	  Integration,	  Net	  Neutrality,	  and	  the	  Network	  Layers	  Model.”	  21	  Epstein,	  “What	  Broadcast	  Licenses	  Tell	  Us	  about	  Net	  Neutrality:	  Cosmopolitan	  Broadcasting	  Corporation	  v.	  FCC”;	  Weisman	  and	  Robinson,	  “Lessons	  for	  Modern	  Regulators	  from	  Hippocrates,	  Schumpeter	  and	  Kahn.”	  22	  Zelnick,	  The	  Illusion	  of	  Net	  Neutrality.	  
17 
The ongoing dispute over neutrality has drawn attention from scholars who have 
analyzed the debate itself – these include studies by Kai Zhu and by Douglas Hass.23 Likewise, 
there have been a handful of studies examining the terminology and rhetorical appeals used by 
both academics and policymakers regarding the issue. These include projects such as a 2013 
analysis of congressional records regarding the issue by Gilroy and a 2013 discourse analysis of 
the term “net neutrality” by Kimball.24  
While these contributions and many others offer significant contributions to the NN 
debate, the issue remains unresolved and is often influenced on a number of fronts including 
politically, economically and by the larger public. While all of these groups have participated in 
the conversation regarding content discrimination, the size and influence of the participants 
with a stake in the outcome is particularly significant.   
1.1.2 Lines drawn in the neutrality debate 
Major participants in the NN debate include some of the world’s largest media 
conglomerates including Comcast, AT&T, and Verizon as well as technology giants like Google, 
Amazon, Facebook, and Microsoft. The issue has garnered political attention ranging from the 
US White House to the leadership of the European Union.25 In particular, neutrality advocates 
have focused on the threat of network management as a tool for corporate or political 
censorship.26 Despite the sometimes-opaque nature of the debate’s technical and legal jargon, 
                                                23	  Zhu,	  “Bringing	  Neutrality	  to	  Network	  Neutrality”;	  Hass,	  “The	  Never-­‐Was-­‐Neutral	  Net	  and	  Why	  Informed	  End	  Users	  Can	  End	  the	  Net	  Neutrality	  Debates.”	  24	  Gilroy,	  “Access	  to	  Broadband	  Networks”;	  Kimball,	  “What	  We	  Talk	  about	  When	  We	  Talk	  about	  Net	  Neutrality:	  A	  Historical	  Genealogy	  of	  the	  Discourse	  of	  ‘Net	  Neutrality.’”	  25	  Marsden,	  Net	  Neutrality;	  Crocioni,	  “Net	  Neutrality	  in	  Europe”;	  Peha,	  The	  Benefits	  and	  
Risks	  of	  Mandating	  Network	  Neutrality,	  and	  the	  Quest	  for	  a	  Balanced	  Policy.	  26	  Brown	  and	  Marsden,	  Regulating	  Code,	  141.	  
18 
the NN discussion has grown to include civil society groups, technological leaders and 
increasingly the larger public.27 
NN not only concerns the practical and financial impact of data and bandwidth 
discrimination to users, content and service providers – but, as Christopher Kelty argues, the 
rules for how content travels online shape the internet’s ethical and technical dimensions. 28 
Advocates argue that the benefits of neutrality as a tool for promoting application innovation,29 
weakening monopoly power,30 protecting free speech and promoting creative content,31 are 
worth the potential cost to network providers.  
While the term NN is relatively new, it follows a legacy of underlying principles 
supporting fair and open access to communication networks as well as content-neutral delivery 
of information with a history extending as far back as the 17th century.32 Beyond the principles 
of open and equal access to the global internet, the distinctions between communication, 
information, infrastructure, and entertainment continue to blur. Networked computing 
increasingly dominates the spaces of information interaction, creation and exchange throughout 
the world. Rapid changes in computing and global networking have rested on the growth of 
fast, uninterrupted, and ubiquitous access to other users, groups and information. But the 
rhetoric of a democratic and equal web should not be accepted as a given. Sophisticated 
networking servers and smart networks can now read data as it moves across the web; this 
                                                27	  American	  Civil	  Liberties	  Union,	  “What	  Is	  Net	  Neutrality?”;	  Cerf,	  “‘Father	  of	  the	  Internet’”;	  Berners-­‐Lee,	  “Net	  Neutrality:	  This	  Is	  Serious”;	  Nagesh,	  “Internet	  Users	  Mobilize	  as	  FCC	  Prepares	  Net	  Neutrality	  Plan.”	  28	  Kelty,	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increases the threat of monitoring and speed management by network owners, often without 
the users’ knowledge.33  
ISPs argue that to handle the rapidly growing number of users with higher bandwidth 
demands, they should have some latitude to manage the volume and types of information 
travelling across their networks.34 NN opponents argue that overt neutrality intervenes in the 
market negotiations between content and network providers and potentially violates the 
property rights of the owners and maintainers of broadband networks.35 They suggest 
neutrality policies preventing the management of content and fee structures may discourage 
network infrastructure improvements and potentially stifling innovation.36 
Due to their control over much of the internet’s physical infrastructure, network owners 
are in a particularly powerful position to exploit or exacerbate bandwidth limitations and 
network capacity to their advantage.37 Wu, however, argues that the intentions of ISPs may 
extend beyond network management for service improvement and toward reinforcing their 
powerful and indispensible role in the information economy.38 He notes: “…it doesn’t take a 
genius to realize that if AT&T and the cable companies exercised broad discretion to speed up 
the business of some firms and slow down that of others, they would gain the power of life and 
death over the Internet.”39  
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1.1.3 A pressing debate 
When the term “network neutrality” was coined in 2003, the capacity for networked 
data transmission and the accessibility to digitally distributed content was far different from 
today.40 Broadband connections (offering download speeds of at least 4 Mbps and upload 
speeds of at least 1 Mbps) have become more prevalent as consumer access to DSL, cable and 
fiber-optic connections have replaced dial-up connections.41 In 2003, 16 percent of U.S. adults 
had a broadband connection at home, a number that would grow to 70 percent only 10 years 
later.42 ISPs have benefited from the increased demand for fast connections and have 
maintained high profit margins – reportedly about 95 to 97 percent - compared to more 
expensive services like cable television which show profits of around 60 percent.43  In 2013, 
roughly a quarter of Comcast’s $40 billion in revenue from cable connection services came from 
its high-speed internet.44 
In the past 30 years, ISPs like Comcast and Verizon have grown tremendously, while 
competition for broadband internet access in the US has shrunk.45 In fact, a 2013 FCC report 
indicated nearly one-third of U.S. residents have access to only one residential broadband 
provider and an additional 37 percent have access to only two ISPs.46 There has also been a 
marked shift toward cable ISPs like Comcast and Time Warner Cable which offer faster use 
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speeds than telephone network based services liked DSL.47 While commercial and residential 
fiber-optic networking service providers (also known as fiber to the premises or FTTP) like 
Verizon FiOS and ATT U-Verse – which offer connections many times faster than cable or DSL 
broadband -- are beginning to emerge and may ultimately shift these dynamics, the majority of 
US internet users rely on a small handful of networks and service providers.48  
Likewise, online Content Service Providers (CSPs) have also grown both in size and 
influence. News, social network, video sharing, and entertainment websites show immense 
popularity; the most popular networks and sites such as Google and Facebook sport billions of 
users and have market valuations of billions of U.S. dollars.49 For example, Google’s massive 
reach extends from online advertising (it’s primary form of revenue) to search, email (Gmail), 
document scanning (Google Books) and many more projects. Siva Viadyanathan argues 
Google’s search prioritization and sheer scale of services is increasingly making the company 
“the lens through which we view the world.”50 That “lens” relies on fast, reliable internet 
access. The growth of CSPs has coincided with a shift in the nature of online use marked by the 
increased popularity of “application” or self-contained and maintained online spaces rather 
than a network of individually created and maintained websites.51  
The increased popularity of online video services has led to a growth in the volume of 
information travelling across networks. Video services such as YouTube, online streaming 
subscription services like Netflix and the growth of peer-to-peer file-sharing services make up 
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an increasingly large portion of U.S. internet traffic.52 Services like Netflix, which boasted over 
44 million subscribers in 2014, are increasingly competing with cable television for viewers.53 
According to a 2014 report by internet traffic monitor Sadnvine, Netflix was responsible for the 
overwhelming majority of downstream internet traffic in the US, with the service consuming 34 
percent of the bandwidth used during peak hours.54 Google-owned video streaming site 
YouTube consumed over 20 percent of the bandwidth in Europe, Asia-Pacific and Latin 
America.55 In the US, the top 15 percent of users were responsible for over half of all internet 
traffic and consumed 11-times more streaming content than the average internet subscriber.56 
ISPs (many of which are also cable television providers) claim the growth of these bandwidth-
heavy services and users requires greater latitude of controls to guarantee consistent service. 
Some critics, like Crawford, argue this control may be used as an excuse to exert pressure on 
video service competitors siphoning “cord cutters” from traditional cable TV service.57  
To complicate matters further, the lines between ISPs and CSPs are eroding. In part, the 
NN debate is the result of the convergence of television, data, and telephone services within a 
single network.58 With previously separate forms of media increasingly traveling across the 
internet infrastructure, network providers are investing in online content (e.g. Comcast’s 
acquisition of NBCUniversal) while some content providers have started investing in 
broadband construction (e.g. Google’s fiber-to-the-home initiatives). Service agreements 
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between content and networks, vertical ownership agreements, and paid access to networks 
further complicate their interactions.59  
These relationships are further complicated by the introduction of customer-facing 
network providers connect to high-capacity backbone network providers (such as Level 3) that 
link ISPs to each other. The agreements between backbone providers have generally received 
far less regulatory scrutiny than those of consumer-facing ISPs.60 According to Lee and Wu, 
these agreements between backbone providers, ISPs and the largest CSPs (often called access 
fees or usage fees) are markedly different from fees charged to consumers.61 
The rapidly shifting conditions surrounding NN have made the issue both more 
pressing, but also more complex. The technological, economic and political specifics of the last 
10 years have changed greatly; the dramatically expanded role of digitally networked 
communication has facilitated a corresponding increase in the power of network operators and 
the concerns of internet users about that power.  
1.2 A multi-dimensional approach 
Network Neutrality has been described as “a subject that sounds mind-numbingly dull,” 
but this may only be a sign of the density and scope of the subject matter.62 The concept lies at 
the center of many ongoing conversations and trends of technology, politics, society and 
economics. Because of this complexity, a critical, historically grounded, and systematic 
examination of the ongoing NN debate is warranted to better understand the nuances and 
development of the neutrality, its major institutional actors, and its place in the larger 
development of the current media/information environment.  
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1.2.1 Neutrality, information and power 
The challenges and opportunities of NN echo those described in earlier media 
scholarship by raising questions about the impact of information technology on political, social, 
and economic life.63 Political economy scholars have paid particular attention to the ways 
institutional structures of ownership, development, and technological shifts have significantly 
affected the expansion, content and larger reception of media throughout the world.64 The 
political economy approach recognizes the importance of examining and analyzing institutional 
and economic power imbalances in society and their possible effects.65  Today, the growing 
importance of global, digital information and communication networks has magnified these 
power imbalances. Robert McChesney and Dan Schiller warn that consolidation of the most 
influential media organizations only increases the potential for censorship, exploitation, 
inequality and silencing.66 The political economy approach encourages critically examining 
these economically powerful institutions and actors, while highlighting the social and political 
implications of their actions. 
Historically, media technologies and networks (as well as their controllers) have acted as 
primary conduits of political, economic and cultural development and power.67 The work of 
Frankfurt School scholars like Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer and their concerns about 
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the political and social effects of media ownership has driven critical media scholarship. 68 
Rapid growth and centralization of media ownership and distribution in the last half of the 20th 
century has inspired political economists and other communication scholars to examine the 
powerful potential and effects of changing media ecologies not only in the U.S. but throughout 
the world. Likewise, studies examining media industries extends the legacy of early media 
scholars while combining the political economy and cultural studies legacies of communication 
research to better understand the nexus of politics, economics, media, and information.69  
The role of media institutions, powerful communication actors and media policy 
extends beyond ownership to the nature of information and the role of it in social and political 
life. As Armand Mattelart notes: information’s role in society has changed greatly since the 
Enlightenment and its collection, ownership and distribution have played a role in the 
acceleration of military expansion, imperialism and global capitalism.70 The expansion of digital 
information across the internet is only the most recent example of this trend. 
Dan Schiller argues information has increasingly become a commodity that is packaged, 
sold and distributed as a major aspect of the current U.S. economy.71 His work traces the legacy 
of intellectual property laws, communication systems and policies in protecting the economic 
potential of information and privileging the powerful corporations and institutions best 
positioned in the global information and media environment.72 With its origins as a 
decentralized communication network for the U.S. military, the global internet increasingly 
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drives economic and political power and because of that, the corporations and organizations 
that control how information moves across the internet wield immense influence.73 
Digitization and global connection has made communication networks (and the 
transportation of information across them) increasingly significant to everyday life and 
commerce. As media ownership continues to concentrate through both vertical and horizontal 
integration and the arbiters of content distribution and creation increasingly merge to become a 
handful of competitors – the means and motivation to exert influence on the traffic of 
information increases. This, combined with laissez-faire regulation and rapid technological 
change, means that it is vital for critical media scholars to focus on issues like infrastructure, 
industrial influence and ownership. 
1.2.2 Four modalities of regulation 
In addition to a critical, political economic perspective which scrutinizes the historical 
and relational shifts of the involved media institutions, this examination of the NN debate 
warrants a theoretical framework that systematically breaks the primary terms and issues of the 
debate into significant, but manageable categories while recognizing the interconnection of each 
category to each other and the issue as a whole.  
                                                73	  Mattelart,	  The	  Information	  Society,	  139;	  Morozov,	  “Freedom.gov.”	  
27 
 
Figure 1.0.1 Lessig's four modalities. 
Lessig’s four modalities, a theoretical design first described in his essay “The New 
Chicago School,” offers a pattern for understanding the multiple dimensions which regulate 
behavior.74 He describes four separate, but cooperating concepts (see Figure 1.) – laws, markets, 
architecture, and norms – which together describe and dictate the tools society has for 
regulating behavior. These four modalities shape the social understanding of issues and their 
role in society.75 Whereas policy studies may be constrained to the law and its effects, a study of 
multiple modalities offers a more encompassing perspective that includes factors like 
commerce, structure and culture.  
Lessig emphasizes that each modality works with and against the others to form a wider 
regulatory environment not limited to any particular aspect.76 The regulations and their 
secondary effects on each other shape behavior for both users and the tools themselves. In the 
context of online activities, Lessig offers a few examples to illustrate each of the modalities.77 
For example:  
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Laws: Many if not all states have laws and policies regarding obscenity, copyright, state 
secrets and speech that continue online different levels of enforceability online. 78 
Norms: Community-accepted social conventions about behavior on message boards or 
comments sections of websites often have standards and customs of behavior. 
Markets: Price structures, advertising agreement, paid access, ownership and 
sponsorship, may affect what people see and do online or their ability to contribute to ongoing 
events or conversations. 
Architecture: The TCP/IP and other protocols of web have been and continue to be 
designed to facilitate particular forms of interaction and activities. The programmed 
architecture of the web enables (or prohibits) various degrees of security, anonymity, 
accountability, tractability and information capacity.79 Because online architecture is 
particularly subject to the whims of its creators and owners, some aspects of the web’s 
architecture may afford greater information spread;80 other parts have been designed to create 
choke points which allowing sophisticated information filtering and censorship.81  
In particular, architectural choices, called “codes” by Lessig, are often the result of 
individual decisions that establish the parameters of online activities (which may or may not 
align with the larger public’s will.)82 He suggests, “the most effective way to regulate behavior 
in cyberspace will be through the regulation of code - direct regulation either of the code of 
cyberspace itself, or of the institutions (code writers) that produce that code.”83 However, this 
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may be easier said than done. Individual instances may be easy for laws to regulate, but larger, 
shifting social trends are much more difficult.84  
Rather than serving as definitive categories, Lessig’s modalities are not meant to be 
exhaustive, but rather a starting point for examining the different vectors that shape human 
behavior. Recently, other scholars have employed similar arrays of categorizations or modalities 
to understand media and technologies are created, consumed or understood. For example, Price 
emphasizes the balancing relationships between sovereignty, technology, and cultural norms in 
his examination of global media power.85 Gillespie examined how platforms interact with 
cultural, regulatory and market demands in his examination of the video site YouTube.86 Van 
Dijck explored the interplay between ownership, technology, governance, usage, content and 
business models in a variety of online platforms while examining the interplay between 
ownership, technology, governance, usage, content, and business models.87 Yang’s The Power of 
the Internet employs a slightly different modality-based scheme for examining online activism in 
China.88 While these adaptations sometime differ from Lessig’s specific modalities in 
terminology and focus, they share an emphasis on examining these media issues across 
multiple, interacting dimensions. 
Neutrality’s ramifications extend beyond policy and to an underlying understanding of 
how users and stakeholders agree the functionality and operation of network protocols may 
operate and how information may be distributed. The expansive and evolving nature of the NN 
issue requires a systematic categorization of the elements operating within the debate. As Lessig 
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notes, “to understand how a regulation might succeed, we must view these four modalities as 
acting on the same field, and understand how they interact.”89 
1.3 Unpacking neutrality regulation 
Network neutrality’s implementation and enforcement in the United States been marked 
by a handful of piecemeal policies and regulations that have been repeatedly struck-down in 
court. Because of this, the handful of policy orders issued by the FCC over the last two decades 
has largely relied on market, architectural and normative conditions of telecommunications and 
internet technology providers to enforce non-discriminatory information movement. Lessig’s 
four modalities (laws, norms, markets, and architecture) offer a way to outline a fuller 
landscape of regulation, and in the case of NN this is particularly true.90  
Unlike previous information communication technologies (like telephones and 
railways), the decentralized nature and protocols of the internet combined with its underlying 
infrastructure has served as both a justification for and against neutrality policies. Likewise, the 
normative understanding of the internet and its relationship to openness and independence 
beyond the physical and technological has fueled and sometimes divided the popular 
understanding of the global networks’ capabilities and the role of users within it. Powerful 
market actors and gatekeepers have an immense influence on users and content.91 The 
following project unpacks these issues by offering comparative study that unpacks multiple 
aspects of the neutrality debate both in the US and abroad.  
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1.3.1 Knowledge through comparison 
As Castells notes, “the United States represents the exception in the history of 
communication regulation from a global perspective.”92 Net neutrality is no exception. Unique 
historical, political, demographic and economic considerations have led to a wide range of 
approaches and perspectives regarding NN.93 For example, some highly developed and 
commercially oriented countries share similar elements to the US and it’s approach to network 
structure, ownership and policies.94 These similarities and differences have been further 
affected by the introduction and growth of international organizations such as the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and global/regional trade agreements like the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or GATT, the World Trade Organization (WTO.)95 Different 
perspectives from throughout the world offer insights into potential solutions, principles and 
challenges in maintaining, establishing or constructing practical and effective non-
discrimination policies.  
1.3.2 Research questions 
This is a project of diagnosis, comparison and analysis. In it, I examine the failure of 
architecture, norms, and markets to maintain network neutrality and prevent information 
discrimination across the Internet in the US. To do this, I examine the concepts and history of 
these elements regarding networked communication as well as compare and contrasting their 
failures (and successes) in other countries throughout the world.  
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With this project I seek to answer the following research questions:  
RQ1: How have laws, norms, architecture, and markets each contributed to the current NN 
regulatory framework in the US?  
 
RQ2: How can the policy responses to market, architecture, and normative regulation of NN 
in select international case studies inform future network neutrality policy in the US? 
1.3.3 Method 
Through a series of comparative case studies highlighting both US and non-US 
approaches to the issue, this project examines the failure of norms, markets, and architecture to 
maintain effective NN policy. As Ran Wei notes, case studies offer a useful tool for researching 
new technologies, particularly because the approach allows researchers to examine specific 
technologies or element of those technologies that are rapidly changing.96 Case studies also 
provide a significant way to examine and unpack complex situations, behaviors or processes.97 
In particular, John Odell notes that comparative case studies provide a powerful methodology 
for examining international political economy issues.98  
While each of the above modalities has drawn the attention of many different groups, 
participants and institutions have played a part in the perception, policymaking and regulation 
of this issue. This process includes tracing and analyzing significant elements of each modality 
within the US context and in the context of each chapter’s selected case studies outlined below. 
These kinds of disciplined, interpretative case studies, particularly when conducted using 
comparative examples, provide deeper context and more nuanced examinations of issues, while 
also offering a tool for critically examining and contextualizing theoretical arguments.99 
But studying how modalities have regulated NN in the US context alone may not be as 
informative as examining them in comparison to other areas around the world. Comparing 
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multiple cases studies gives an opportunity to both examine the conditions affecting each while 
also highlighting their relevance in a broader context.100 Arend Lijphart notes that comparative 
studies should be resorted to when the number of cases are too small for an adequate control to 
be found, however in cases of comparing state approaches, their status as a unified political 
body offers some baseline for comparison101 Because of this project’s focus on the regulation of 
a global issue by national policy decisions, the following project compares only select case 
studies of where regulatory, cultural, geographic, and economic conditions are relatively 
comparable.  
Starke argues the combination of qualitative analysis within comparative case study 
projects offers researchers a useful method for tracing changes in decisions and beliefs, 
particularly in the case of policies.102 Thus, case studies examining the regulatory effects of 
these modalities with selected non-US approaches offers a tool for answering the above research 
questions by contrasting the potential effects of differing conditions and policies on the 
regulation of NN. These documents include, statements, testimony and financial reporting from 
corporate ISP and CSP participants in the debate, as well as similar documents from civil society 
organizations including legal and academic experts, governments, international governance 
organizations, non-governmental organizations. Examining US and non-US approaches to these 
elements in relation to each other brings into relief the failures or successes of each modality to 
preserve NN in the US. Likewise, they also reveal the benefits or consequences of alternate 
policy opportunities and trends which may guide the US’s approach to the debate moving 
forward. For that reason, this use of comparative case studies offers a particularly useful 
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method for contextualizing and unpacking the claims made by Yoo, Theierer and Epstein that 
non-policy alternatives are a viable alternative to more explicit network neutrality rules.103  
1.3.4 Significance 
NN is a vast and complex subject that demands continued examination and analysis. 
This project contributes to that body of work by offering a multi-dimensional, systematic 
approach to the topic and features comparative analyses between the US approach and other 
select international case studies. While Lessig has played a significant role in the NN debate and 
has used the modalities approach to look at cyber-regulation, to my knowledge the approach 
has not been used for an in-depth examination of network neutrality.104 This thesis shows the 
utility of this approach while also seeking to categorize and clarify previously complex aspects 
of neutrality regulation. 
The combination of multi-dimensional analysis using Lessig’s modalities, along with 
comparative case studies demonstrate how network neutrality issues are addressed (or not 
addressed) in the US and abroad. As neutrality policy is being negotiated both in popular press, 
academic institutions and political halls – a series of comparative case studies like this offers a 
way to understand the issue’s history and conditions using multiple examples and situations.  
The combination of these two approaches offers insight into NN conditions and policy 
approaches that affect neutrality’s success or failure. In particular, it demonstrates the failures of 
markets, architecture, or norms to exclusively preserve content non-discrimination online and 
shows the need for strong policy measures to maintain certain principles of network 
communication.  
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1.4 Chapter outline 
This project dedicates a chapter to each of the four modalities listed above as well as a 
conclusion in which I outline several policy proposals based upon the findings of this 
comparative analysis.  
In chapter two, I outline the current state of network neutrality as it has been 
acknowledged, supported or dismantled through US law and policy – primarily focusing on the 
actions of the FCC, which in lieu of more direct legislation has played the most significant role 
in interpreting, shaping and maintaining NN in the US. This chapter offers an overview of the 
network neutrality conditions facing the US today as well as the policy approaches and their 
effects. Specifically, it demonstrates the pattern of neutrality policy development from its 
origins in the policies governing legacy technologies to an ongoing balance between 
deregulation and the FCC’s nominal attempts to preserve the principles of content non-
discrimination and the Open Internet in the face of increasingly constraining court rulings.  
Chapter three examines the architecture of the internet and the contested nature of its 
structure on both infrastructural and protocol levels. Lessig emphasizes the role of code (the 
actual programmed and adaptable nature of digital spaces) as well as the actual infrastructure 
in dictating use, particularly online.105 This chapter highlights the competing protocols whose 
evolution has shaped the potential for network management. It also focuses on the 
infrastructure elements and how their relationship to each other affects the potential for 
neutrality. To highlight this, I compare the US infrastructure to new nationally designed and 
constructed infrastructures in Australia and New Zealand and the extent to which these designs 
both preserve and potentially endanger neutrality. Likewise, it examines how architecture has 
                                                105	  Lessig,	  “The	  Law	  of	  the	  Horse”;	  Lessig,	  “In	  Support	  of	  Network	  Neutrality.”	  
36 
been used not only to preserve network neutrality, but examples where architecture actively 
intervenes and discriminates in the movement of online content. 
Chapter four explores how markets and economics have driven much of the regulatory 
discussions regarding network discrimination and neutrality.106 The vertical integration of 
network and content providers is the result of increasing deregulation and laissez-faire policies 
toward media organizations over the last 30 years.107 This concentration of the most powerful 
network actors in concert with legal protectionism toward legacy media institutions compared 
to emerging ones has only emphasized the massive market stakes of the network neutrality 
debate. This chapter examines the commercial market evolution of internet access and 
competition in the US and its failure to preserve neutrality. I examine how European Union 
policymakers have designed and pursued policies designed to encourage market competition 
through unbundling and industry-wide, principle-based strategies for encouraging neutrality 
through competition. This chapter highlights the potential benefits and limitations of market-
based regulation in generating neutrality.  
Chapter five shows the significance of normative views affecting the development and 
continuance of network neutrality. It emphasizes the legacy of common carrier principles which 
have set a historical standard for the expectations of communication networks, the perspective 
of the web as a commons of equal distribution and participation has significantly affected the 
expectations and descriptions of globally networked computer technology. This chapter 
emphasizes the role leading public figures and civil society groups have played in the portrayal 
of network neutrality and it’s representations in regards to the “open internet” in the US. This 
case study highlights the role international internet governance groups such as the ITU have 
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played or interfered in setting international normative standards for how nations should 
address the issue of network neutrality. These international standards both reflect the US’s 
position and sometimes affect US policy approaches to the issue. 
In the conclusion chapter, I outline some of the most significant network neutrality 
policy proposals highlighted by the preceding comparative case studies. These proposals range 
from the easily implemented to more complex institutional and structural changes that may 
create more equitable content distribution across the internet. The differences and similarities 
highlighted by the previous chapters case studies offer a range of options available for US 
policy moving forward. By examining the failure of existing non-policy options for protecting 
and promoting network neutrality, I emphasize a handful of common principles contributing to 
ongoing network neutrality discussions.  
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2     US NETWORK NEUTRALITY POLICY: AN OVERVIEW 
This chapter provides a brief history of policy decisions affecting today’s 
network neutrality debate. Specifically, it offers an overview of the major policy events 
and shifts leading to an over-reliance on the other three modalities to preserve content 
non-discrimination online. The amount of interest these principles have received is 
often the result of specific historical trends in technology, markets, and norms and this 
often reflects those influences. 
2.1 Chasing changing technologies 
Information policy has played a significant role in the rule of powerful states and 
actors throughout recorded history.108 Our modern conception of media policy is far 
more recent, particularly in regards to the technologies used to transmit information.109 
In some ways, the Internet is unlike any previous information communication 
technology. While it relies on the same interconnection and interoperability of networks 
like telephone or electricity, its operations are far more decentralized and its protocols 
are generally open and free to new users.110 Because of this, a wide range of authorities, 
organizations with many different powers and interests have participated in setting and 
maintaining internet policy.  
In the political economy tradition, historical analysis plays an important role in 
unpacking the movement of power and social change. Mosco notes that the study of 
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history is one of the central tenants of the approach and that “one simply cannot do 
good political economy without history.”111 These analyses recognize the ongoing 
project of change and the influence social, economic, political and technological forces 
play in both the history of events and how those events are represented.112  With that as 
a guide, this chapter offers a historical revue of policy and legal choices affecting 
network neutrality while avoiding falling into the trap of determinism. 
In this context, it’s important to note the role of policy in this discussion.  In his 
outline of the four-modality approach, Lawrence Lessig summarizes that in its most 
basic form, law is a form of regulation that threatens sanctions if disobeyed.113 
Communication scholar Sandra Braman notes that law and policy are slightly different 
aspects of governance: law offers an explicit rule, policy is a formal or semi-formal 
established principle.114 As this chapter shows, the distinctions between these elements 
may be significant in specific contexts (see the section on Comcast Corp. v FCC). It 
should be noted, that the implications of law and policy as direct representations of the 
public’s will are complex and disputed.115 However, Lessig notes that examining the 
regulatory effects of law and policy are more useful lenses for studying technology and 
media regulation, than focusing on the legitimacy of those laws.116 
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2.1.1 A powerful place at the table 
Today, the networks through which information travels have often played a 
particularly influential role in enacting or avoiding policy actions. Because these 
network owners are often also the owners of legacy networks (mostly telephone and 
cable), they often occupy a powerful position for shaping these new technological 
developments and policy.117 It should be no surprise that they have used this power to 
their advantage and to protect their existing media holdings.118 Not only that, but these 
few actors hold particularly powerful positions of influence with the political structure 
responsible for maintaining and establishing media policy favorable to entrenched 
interests.119 Holt describes the conundrum:  
Converging entertainment, information, and communication industries are being 
regulated by policies designed for a different era. Meanwhile, the technologies, 
markets, and regulatory principles for these industries are no longer distinct 
enough to accommodate separate paradigms.120 
 
In recent decades, rapid technological changes have been to justify  deregulation 
and media concentration in the name of public interest.121 Network neutrality lies at the 
heart of the current conflict about the role of the internet: Is it part of the commons or is 
it a collection of privately operated spaces?122 For Mueller, the debate “signals a major 
renegotiation of the relationship between what is private, differentiated and managed 
and what is uniform and common on the internet.”123  
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2.2 Policy for the public 
Since early in the 20th century, media policy has sought to find a balance 
between public and private interests.124 The Federal Radio Commission (FRC), which 
later was renamed in 1934 as the FCC was first created to serve just this purpose – 
bringing order to the onslaught of commercial radio broadcasters overlapping each 
other across the airwaves that were considered in the public’s jurisdiction.125 The 
commission also took a strong role in the governance of telephone networking 
(dominated by the AT&T monopoly) as interconnection and long distance 
communication became an increasingly valuable activity.126 
Common carriage, a term now more often associated with regulating 
infrastructure and monopolies, has a long legacy leading to today’s network neutrality 
debate. In his work, Beyond Liberalization II, Eli Noam argues the term, first associated 
with service in the public interest, extends as far back as the Roman Empire:  
For centuries, common carriage principles have played an important role in the 
infrastructure services of transportation and communications. They intended to 
guarantee that no customer seeking service upon reasonable demand, willing 
and able to pay the established price, however set, would be denied lawful use of 
the service or would otherwise be discriminated against.127 
 
Common Carriage rules were used to help decide liability in cases of robbery, 
attack or destruction.128 Generally, common carriage rules were instituted to protect the 
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public interest from abuse with an expectation of service, particularly in regards to 
transportation services like railroads and transportation.129 Beginning in the mid-1800s, 
municipalities and states began offering franchises to telegraph companies with the 
understanding that this would provide safer conditions than allowing all comers to 
construct networks.130 The legacy of this is seen today as cable and telephone operators 
continue to sign exclusive franchise agreements with cities and towns.131 In the 1860s, a 
series of laws passed by the US congress authorizing the expansion of telegraph 
networks – with provisions that these networks offer equal access, pricing for use 
without discrimination. 132  Those same protections were expanded to telephones in 
1910. These policies were largely reinforced through the early 20th century, with judges 
noting the public interest of common carriers and the services they provided.133 The 
Communications Act of 1934, which created the FCC also further clarified rules 
regulating the existing monopolies of AT&T (telephone) and Western Union (telegraph) 
as common carriers, subject to regulations made in the interest of the public.134 Through 
subsequent revisions, the rules of common carriage have survived for 
telecommunications networks – though some notable exceptions including data services 
and cable television were carved out as they emerged.135 
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The basis for the exclusion of internet service from common carrier obligations is 
in many ways a result of its newness. Because communication policies must be 
developed as the technologies emerged, rules created for previous technologies often 
become the rules governing new ones. Legislation and FCC rules based on remote data 
processing technology of the 1970s and cable television networks of the 1990s became 
the basis for broadband’s exemption from common carriage obligations.136 The result is 
a shift from common carrier providers who offered greater protection for public 
interactions in exchange for private contract carriers with much greater flexibility to 
grow but also more control over the content traveling across their networks.137 
Whether for practical or political reasons, the FCC’s choice to separate 
broadband service from the potentially onerous (but also non-discriminatory) 
obligations of common carriers holds the potential for slowing innovation as well.138 
Years after the 2002 cable internet order which classified broadband as an “information 
service,” ISPs have become increasingly dominant and the web has become an essential 
part of everyday life and commerce for many.139 
                                                136	  Marsden,	  Net	  Neutrality,	  31–34;	  Crawford,	  Captive	  Audience,	  53–55.	  137	  Noam,	  “Beyond	  Liberalization	  II,”	  448–452;	  Frieden,	  “Contamination	  of	  the	  Common	  Carrier	  Concept	  in	  Telecommunications,”	  695–696.	  138	  Patel,	  “The	  Wrong	  Words”;	  Federal	  Communications	  Commission,	  “FCC	  Classifies	  Cable	  Modem	  Service	  as	  ‘Information	  Service’:	  Initiates	  Proceeding	  to	  Promote	  Broadband	  Deployment	  and	  Examine	  Regulatory	  Implications	  of	  Classification.”	  139	  Crawford,	  “Back	  to	  the	  Digital	  Drawing	  Board.”	  
44 
2.3 New connections: the internet emerges 
Like its predecessors (radio, television and cable television) rules regarding the 
internet emerged slowly.140 Originally built as decentralized network to connect 
research computers, the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network or ARPANET 
was funded by the research division of the US Department of Defense.141 First 
connected in 1969, the network linked a handful of participating research institutions 
including the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) and the University of Southern 
California’s Information Sciences Institute (ISI) and would ultimately grow to connect 
dozens of research institutions and government agencies.142  
The ability to operate these connections across AT&T’s telephone network was in 
part thanks to two landmark regulatory decisions. Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States 
and the FCC’s 1968 Carterfone ruling formed the basis for much of the non-
discrimination standards in the US.143 The Carterfone decision ended AT&T’s strict 
control over the attachment of third-party devices to its network. These rulings would 
pave the way for the use of telephone communication networks for other information 
transmission.144 This would ultimately allow users and businesses to connect modems 
and computers directly to telephone networks and the internet.  
By the 1970s, telephone networks were being used not only for the transmission 
conversations, but also of data. The growth of this technology allowing computers to 
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transmit over traditional telephone networks led the FCC take a stronger role in 
arbitrating how these actions should take place. In a series of inquiries, as Bagwell 
notes, the FCC attempted to distinguish between how that information was to be 
regulated: in 1966 Computer I sought to distinguish telecom technology (which is subject 
to common carriage regulations) from data processing technology, while the 1979 
Computer II decision separated basic (information transmitted unchanged) and 
enhanced information communications.145 These inquiries established requirements 
ensuring public access through regulated telecommunications infrastructure, in contrast 
to broadcasting and cable transmission regulated based on content. The 1985 Computer 
III inquiry proposed unbundled and equal access to basic network services, but the FCC 
chose to apply these new rules only to wireline services, excluding the growing DSL 
and cable broadband Internet service.146 The 1984 breakup of AT&T into eight “baby 
bells” fragmented the company’s network monopoly and further increased the variety 
of the networks available for all purpose, unrestricted use.147 
The expansion of the internet was in part funded through the support of research 
universities and institutions as well as through the financial and logistical support of 
the National Science Foundation who designed and managed the initial internet 
backbone known as NSFNET that connected research institutions across the country.148 
The network was proposed as an alternative to the practice of leasing large 
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communication pathways through telephone operators.149 With congressional support 
from then-Tennessee Senator and future-Vice President Al Gore in funding for the 
National Research and Education Network was passed in 1991 and helped fund 
dramatic expansions for NSFNET that would ultimately be privatized in 1996.150 The 
development and expansion of NSFNET helped shape the initial US infrastructure of 
what would become the commercial internet. 
2.4 Commercialization and deregulation 
The 1990s and 2000s saw an incredible growth in internet use and popularity. 
Likewise, the trends of media consolidation, concentration and deregulation that began 
in the 1980s continued to expand to the emerging internet ecosystem.151 In  1997, the 
Clinton administration’s “Framework for Global Electronic Commerce,” offered a 
neutrality-like endorsement of an unrestricted internet, but this appeared to be largely 
focused on supporting the economic expansion of internet services, rather than setting a 
precedent for protecting content.152 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not 
expressly include internet and broadband transmissions, but the law sought to 
encourage expansion of service through non-intervention.153 Instead it roughly outlined 
rules based on the types of technologies involved: telecommunications technology 
operating on telephone wires were classified as Title II and afforded common carriage 
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rules under, coaxial cable services were classified under Title VI and generally 
considered entertainment, etc.154 However, the role of internet service was less clear.  
Because the internet operated on both telephone and cable networks, there was a 
need to clarify what rules should apply. If it was considered primarily a 
telecommunications transmission, the rules of common carriage would be maintained; 
if considered a cable service, greater control would remain with network operators. In 
lieu of clear guidelines regarding internet classification, the US Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled common carriage telecommunications rules should apply to internet 
service.155 In response, the FCC used its powerful classification powers to outline 
broadband serve, not as a telecommunication service, but instead as a separate 
“information” technology.156 This decision, outlined in the 2002 Cable Internet Order 
issued by chairman Michael Powell, declared internet services operating on telephone 
lines as not subject to common carrier protections are one such example. Claiming that 
minimal regulation would spur innovation for the new medium, the order meant 
internet traffic would be governed based on its use, rather than the particular 
infrastructure it traveled.157  
In the 2005 National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X case the US 
Supreme Court ruled that based in part on the FCC’s previous rules, providers should 
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not be considered common carriers and were under no obligation to allow access from 
other ISPs.158 Following the Brand X supreme court decision in 2005, the FCC issued a 
series of broadband policy statements emphasizing access to lawful content, application 
and device use as well as competition among network, application, service and content 
providers.159 Despite this gesture toward neutrality, accusations of blocking and 
throttling emerged. Not only after the 2005 policy was adopted, the FCC began 
investigating accusations from VoIP provider Vonage that a small ISP, Madison River 
Communications, was blocking its service to benefit Madison River’s own phone 
services.160 In response, the FCC initiated an investigation of the blocking, but the ISP 
agreed to stop targeted blocking and paid a voluntary fine to have the accusations 
dismissed.161 
2.5 A new hope? 
Network neutrality gained prominence in national U.S. politics when in October 
2007, then-Senator Barack Obama, while running for the Democratic nomination for the 
2008 Presidential election, said he claimed support for net neutrality and would appoint 
FCC officials who also supported the policy.162 During the 2008 campaign, Obama’s 
position stood in stark contrast to that of Republican John McCain, whose platform 
rejected new regulations on Internet providers in favor of voluntary access promotion 
agreements.  
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By May 2009, net neutrality returned to the political spotlight. In a speech on 
cybersecurity, President Obama reaffirmed his commitment to Network Neutrality 
while emphasizing that his “administration will not dictate security standards for 
private companies. On the contrary, we will collaborate with industry to find 
technology solutions that ensure our security and promote prosperity."163 
The FCC’s 2010 loss in a legal challenge to Comcast forced Chairman Julius 
Genachowski to further clarify the FCC’s net neutrality position. Since 2007, the FCC 
had taken part in an ongoing legal debate (spanning the Bush and Obama 
administrations) in which the commission censured Comcast after the cable provider 
was accused of throttling peer-to-peer web traffic.164 In early 2010, a federal appeals 
court ruled in Comcast Corp. v. FCC in the cable company’s favor, arguing the FCC’s 
policy statement was not sufficient to penalize Comcast’s actions. In other words, if the 
FCC wanted to set network neutrality rules, they would have to set forth an explicit 
order, rather than a vague policy.  
With the Comcast case as the background, Genachowski outlined new, clearer 
neutrality rules. The chairman emphasized the need for rules to preserve an open 
Internet and those established rules would serve as the basis for case-by-case 
enforcement of policies by the FCC.165 The FCC’s 2010 Open Internet Order consisted of 
three rules intended to build on the four neutrality-like 2005 policies.166 The order 
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included three elements: transparency, no blocking and no unreasonable 
discrimination. Under the order, internet providers would be held to a new standard of 
transparency regarding network management practices, though they would not be 
required to reveal sensitive business information. Next, the rule prohibited blocking 
content online. Finally, the rule prohibited providers from discriminating, slowing, or 
disfavoring of lawful content. The latter two rules include exception for “reasonable 
network management” which as is noted in later chapters, has become a contentious 
issue.167 The Chairman defended these policies in 2011 before the House of 
Representatives Committee on Intellectual Property, Competition and the Internet 
arguing they were necessary to ensure fairness and competition online.168  
NN in the U.S. remained relatively stable and under-the-radar until the 
announcement of the 2014 Verizon vs. FCC ruling formally decisively throwing out the 
2010 open internet orders. Despite the ruling’s elimination of the existing network 
neutrality orders, the Obama administration argued it would continue to support open 
internet policies. In a virtual forum event, Obama emphasized his continued support 
for NN as well as his confidence in recently appointed FCC chair (and former telecom 
investor) Tom Wheeler’s commitment to the issue.169 Despite this recommitment to the 
issue, Wheeler emphasized the FCC would neither appeal the Verizon ruling, nor would 
it immediately reclassify internet services as a common carrier protected 
telecommunications service but instead seek to use commissions newly-confirmed 
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regulatory powers confirmed in the ruling.170 Less than a month after the Open Internet 
Order was issued, telecommunications giant Verizon filed suit with the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia claiming the agency’s order overstepped 
its authority to regulate the web based on the FCC’s previous rulings.171 
2.6 Back to the drawing board 
After years in court, the US Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Verizon in 
January 2014. In the decision, the court arguing that while the FCC had jurisdiction to 
regulate internet services (under the 1996 Act’s Section 706,) but blocking and 
discrimination prohibitions of the 2010 Open Internet Order were too similar to 
common carriage regulations and therefore were dismissed.172  The decision was clear: 
the US would need to find a different approach for preserving network neutrality. 
In February 2014, recently-appointed FCC Wheeler outlined the FCC’s new 
approach which included: Retooled nondiscrimination, anti-blocking and transparency 
rules; new attempts to examine reclassification; seek public comment; and support 
growing public and local competition to ISPs.173 To the concern of NN advocates, the 
FCC’s initial proposal also suggested opportunities for ISPs to create “fast lanes” – 
channels of web traffic that could be treated differently than existing internet service.174 
While the commission continues to accept comments regarding the proposed rules, in a 
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congressional hearing Wheeler claimed “fast lanes” would violate the “commercially 
reasonable” wording of the FCC’s proposed rules.175 
While reclassifying broadband as a telecommunications may be potentially 
disruptive, few options are left for enforcing equal network access and non-
discrimination. Following the Verizon ruling open-internet advocates and organizations 
like the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), which have previously resisted 
endorsement of reclassification, announced their public support for applying common 
carriage rules to the web.176 McMillan suggests reclassification may be one of the FCC’s 
only options for re-balancing the power between ISPs and users:  
[Reclassification] would give the FCC the regulatory teeth needed to keep 
internet access open in a reasonable way to make sure that service providers 
don’t grow into kingmakers—deciding which online companies can flourish on 
the net and which can’t.”177 
 
With the potential of reclassification remains open, legislation has been introduced 
to the US House of Representatives that would ban reclassification before it could 
occur.178 In fact, a number of bills - both supporting and opposing network neutrality – 
have been introduced in the US congress in 2014, but given its recent gridlock, these are 
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probably more likely to be political gestures rather than realistic solutions.179 It should 
be noted that telecom corporations have invested a tens of millions of dollars into 
lobbying against network neutrality and in 2013 anti-neutrality donors outspent pro-
neutrality lobbyists 3-1.180   
2.7 Conclusion 
In attempting to both regulate and promote the economic success of both 
involved industries (not to mention satisfy the public’s demand for fast, reliable and 
affordable Internet access,) the U.S. government leadership and the FCC are in the 
uncomfortable position of attempting to satisfy all involved parties. While legislators in 
congress have visited the issue on a number of occasions and proposed a handful of 
unsuccessful bills both for and against more formal neutrality, there appears to have 
been little incentive by lawmakers to pursue the issue further.181 This chapter’s 
historical overview of US network neutrality policy has shown that combination of 
elements has denied, diluted, delayed, or dismissed attempts to codify clear, firm non-
discrimination rules. While there have been attempts to expand these principles, they 
have been instead thwarted by competing interests. The result has been piecemeal steps 
toward creating a relevant and enforceable network neutrality policy. These half-
measures in lieu of more robust policy culminated in the 2014 Verizon ruling nullifying 
the FCC’s 2010 attempts at a establishing a neutrality standard.  
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Previously, the FCC’s minimalist and non-binding approach to NN relied on the 
continuing norms of non-discriminatory content treatment, competition between 
market actors and the development of architecture encoded with these priorities. 
However, each of these in their current condition is not enough to preserve NN across 
the web. Examining each of these three aspects of network neutrality separately and in 
relation to similar conditions throughout the world gives a clearer vision of the 
structure of online interaction and governance as well as a potential vision for its future. 
 
  
55 
3     NEUTRALITY AND ARCHITECTURE 
This chapter examines the architectural regulation of network neutrality. In 
particular, it highlights both the power and malleability of architecture as a tool for 
regulating behavior. While some elements of the internet architecture like end-to-end 
protocols appear to encourage content non-discrimination, other elements like the 
infrastructure for managing these increasingly-popular networks have also been used to 
exert unprecedented power of communication flows. The infrastructure of the web 
extends great distances and consists of many levels of both physical and digital 
structures. In Australia and New Zealand there have been attempts to reshape the 
architecture of the internet through new high-capacity infrastructure initiatives, but 
while these new architectures are different from those in the US, so far they appear to 
have done little to affect the power imbalances between network operators and users.   
3.1 An invisible regulator 
Architecture is an incredibly influential but sometimes-invisible aspect of the 
Internet ecosystem. Features built into the architecture of the web have shaped network 
neutrality’s existence and undoubtedly will shape its future. This architecture includes 
not only the physical connections within and between networks, but also the protocols 
that dictate how information is handled as it moves between users.  
Internet architecture is generally sorted into organizational levels called “layers,” 
each of which pertain to different aspects of the information transport system. There 
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have been many attempts at creating an ideal layers model.182 Most generally accepted 
models describes four such layers: the physical infrastructure (computers, routers and 
cables,) the logical or protocol layer, the application layer (such as a website or 
application or media player) and content (the actual information being sent and 
received).183  While each of these layers is important for the design and execution of 
globally connected computer networks, the next sections focus in particular on the first 
two: the physical infrastructure layer and the protocol layer. 
Incremental architecture choices during the internet’s growth both allowed for 
the development of network neutrality just as similar choices by network operators are 
increasingly eroding that same neutrality. This can be seen in the shift of guiding 
protocols from an earlier end-to-end to more current quality-of-service questions of 
which focus less on equality of transmission than on network management.  
In the US, these shifts away from neutrality are also seen in the concentration 
and powerful role infrastructure owners and organizations have taken in determining 
the shape of the web. However, not all internet infrastructures are created or managed 
equally. In the past, these network owners and operators have claimed neutrality stands 
in the way of future development, but the cases of new centralized broadband 
architecture projects in Australia and New Zealand call these assumptions and the 
larger role of architecture in internet regulation into question.   
                                                182	  Thierer,	  “Are	  Dumb	  Pipe	  Mandates	  Smart	  Public	  Policy	  -­‐	  Vertical	  Integration,	  Net	  Neutrality,	  and	  the	  Network	  Layers	  Model,”	  277;	  Lemley	  and	  Lessig,	  “The	  End	  of	  End-­‐to-­‐End,”	  6;	  Wu,	  The	  Master	  Switch:	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Information	  Empires,	  585;	  Cerf,	  “The	  Open	  Internet:	  What	  It	  Is,	  and	  Why	  It	  Matters,”	  18.2;	  Lehr	  and	  Chapin,	  “On	  the	  Convergence	  of	  Wired	  and	  Wireless	  Access	  Network	  Architectures,”	  38.	  183	  Whitt,	  “A	  Deference	  to	  Protocol,”	  732–734.	  
57 
 
3.1.1 Building for openness, or control 
Lessig argues that the modality of architecture in cyberspace, consisting of 
structure and protocol choices, is particularly powerful for determining user behavior 
and the networks’ potential.184 The structure and rules guiding how these networks 
operate is neither accidental nor is it discovered, but instead the result of conscious 
choices codified into the system.185 Not surprisingly, these architectural choices may also 
be the result of policy guidance, market forces, or established norms. As the desires of 
network managers or users change, so do the networks themselves. Some computer 
networks may be both programmed to promote content openness and increased access. 
Others work to maintain censorship and steer traffic to enrich those controlling the 
networks. Changes to these networks are often made by a small group rather than 
publically negotiated and those choices form a kind of invisible, privatized law 
regulating behavior.186 
Lessig notes that depending on these structural choices, architecture may be 
wielded as a tool for information freedom or repression:  
If some architectures are more regulable than others—if some give governments 
more control than others— then governments will favor some architectures more 
than others. Favor, in turn, can translate into action, either by governments, or 
for governments. Either way, the architectures that render space less regulable 
can themselves be changed to make the space more regulable.187 
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In other words: when parameters of behavior are dictated by the architecture, 
rather than through explicit laws, design principles become substitutes for public 
policy. Lessig suggests the public should consciously consider whether online 
architectures reflect the values and needs of the larger public, rather than the choices of 
network programmers and operators.188 He argues this balance justifies the actions of 
regulators to reconcile network design with public needs.189 But as the ongoing network 
neutrality debate shows, the process of changing code is rarely that simple. 
While Lessig and others have said the origins of the internet are based in the 
principles of content non-discrimination and reasonable access online, the malleability 
of internet architecture and infrastructure means those principles are far from 
guaranteed. Instead, the weakening of the network neutrality principles embedded in 
the internet’s architecture is the result of choices by powerful network operators to 
favor their own control or profits over the needs of the public at large. 
3.1.2 Building neutrality 
The design and structure of the internet is incredibly complex and technical, but 
unpacking the primary discussions regarding its protocols and physical infrastructure 
is vital for unpacking architecture’s affect on network neutrality. This chapter examines 
some of the most conspicuous architecture issues supporting and sometimes hindering 
NN. The Internet has changed immensely since it’s beginning. The initial design of the 
internet – going as far back as its Defense Department and academic origins with 
ARPANET – was based on a decentralized structure enshrined in the non-
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discriminating, first-come-first-serve protocols of TCP/IP programming.190 Protocols 
like HTTP and SFTP were designed for all types of users to openly access, develop for, 
and create content and they continue to be used today.191 For these reasons, neutrality 
advocates argue the internet was built on a foundation of network neutrality.  
But NN opponents argue today’s demands on the internet require new 
approaches and designs and offer a handful of claims to justify greater control of how 
users access the web. They claim the physical costs of internet infrastructure and the 
burden of the web’s heaviest users warrants new tools and policies for managing how 
information moves across the networks. In addition to the cost of physical architecture, 
they argue the changing nature of web 2.0 and increasingly demanding applications 
(like video streaming, VoIP, IPTV, etc.) warrant more complex procedures, 
mechanisms, and protocols.192 ISPs and network operators claim the heaviest users 
stress the network and penalize average users by occupying a fixed amount of 
bandwidth and transmission space while still paying the same rates.193 They also claim 
strong network management allows for content and applications online, while 
potentially arbitrary regulations on these tools may have unforeseen and potentially 
harmful effects on the future development of the network of networks.194  
But it remains worth considering whether increased network management 
ultimately serves the needs of internet’s users or merely enriches private corporate 
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network operators and owners. Because the internet was initially built with public 
resources, there is a legitimate claim that decisions regarding its use and design should 
be made with the public’s interest primarily in mind.195 However, understanding the 
many levels upon which these decisions can be made requires a more sophisticated 
explanation of the internet’s architecture. 
3.1.3 An ally or a threat 
At its simplest, internet networking is a system which allows information broken 
into electronic packets to be transferred from a computer in one location to another 
computer in another location and vice versa.196 These computers may be directly 
connected to each other, but more often the information travels across great distances, 
changing hands through multiple routing devices and networks. The protocols of the 
internet are designed to move data to the first available open path, however direct, or 
indirect it may be from its intended destination.197 Generally, internet protocols are 
designed to move data in most direct path to its destination, but if networks are 
congested that same data may be sent on a more complex or longer path if that path 
becomes open first.  
However, the features of both the physical and protocol layers continue to 
change as the network management tools become more sophisticated. Network owners 
may respond to user traffic by prioritizing protocols to encourage particular types of 
behavior that services there interests. For example, smart networks may send certain 
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types of data (like prioritized video) on direct paths, while less desired data (like peer-
to-peer transfers) is sent to longer, slower routes. Similarly, the physical infrastructure 
of the internet, made possible through complex technological and economic 
connections, affects how quickly and efficiently data moves between users and across 
networks. The types of connections available and the agreements between 
infrastructure owners like backbone providers and last-mile network providers affects 
how easily and affordably users can connect to each other. Without network neutrality 
rules, the manipulation of protocols and infrastructure by network owners/operators is 
a particularly invisible and powerful tool for altering or blocking the movement of 
content online. 
3.2 Protocols: equality versus quality 
To highlight the malleability of internet architecture and its flexibility to function 
as both a foundation for network neutrality or the source of its undoing, I will highlight 
two competing protocols which operate within the TCP/IP system. On the one hand, 
the End-to-End (or e2e) model emphasizes the role of senders and receivers on each 
“end” of a digital communication with little network interference in between. On the 
other, Quality of Service (or QoS) emphasizes measures within a network to ensure 
transmissions are received fully and accurately. McKelvey notes the choice to structure 
networks focus on either protocol may result in significant effects:  
The E2E model overlooks the connections, but fully recognizes the ends. The QoS 
model devalues the ends as contributors to the network in favour of centralized 
hubs serving content and ensuring proper transport. These tensions are 
political—a source of conflict, not consensus.”198 
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Each of these models offers benefits and consequences for both users and 
network operators with widely different implications for network neutrality. 
3.2.1 End to end 
The end-to-end model has served as the basis for the open, interconnected 
architecture of the Internet.199 It describes one of the most basic elements of the packet 
switching algorithms that constitute the TCP/IP systems still used online today. In the 
most basic sense, e2e focuses encoding and decoding at the computer it is sent and 
received, rather than being processed at an intermediary during transmission. This 
process, outlined by David Reed, David Clark, and Jerome Saltzer in the 1984 paper 
“End-to-End Arguments in System Design,” downplays the importance of the network 
itself and instead relies on the “ends” for processing the information.200  
Vinton Cerf, one of the developers of the TCP/IP protocols argues this pattern 
was chosen intentionally:   
The Internet was designed to allow applications to reside essentially at the 
'edges' of the network, rather than in the core of the network itself. This is 
precisely the opposite of the traditional telephony and cable networks, where 
applications and content are implemented in the core (in headends and central 
offices), away from the users at the edge.201 
 
But the success of this style of protocol was not guaranteed during the 
development of early computer networking technologies. Between the 1970s and 1990s 
other competition included Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) protocol, which 
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favored more centralized network processing and slower, less versatile (but more 
reliable) data transfer protocols.202 Ultimately, TCP/IP’s usability and popularity among 
both professionals and enthusiasts along with its ability to work on many physical 
platforms contributed to its ultimate success and growth.203 At the time, OSI offered 
better tools for network security and had slowly begun to gain popularity, particularly 
among European governments, but TCP/IP’s established reputation and proven 
interoperability/compatibility led to its popularity over the other competing protocol 
suites.204 
Lessig has argued the simplicity of the internet’s e2e architecture is a key factor 
in its success.205 He notes the flexibility of e2e allows for maximum participation within 
the network – which ultimately contributes to its overall value.206 This design structure 
allows the infrastructure to remain relatively simple while pushing “complexity to the 
edge of the network—to the applications that run on the network, rather than the 
network’s core.”207 This principle serves as the basis upon which a great deal of pro-
network neutrality arguments rest: that interference through blocking, discrimination or 
altering of content as it travels across a network interferes with the original design 
principles of the internet.208 
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The simplicity of e2e may be both its greatest strength and weakness. By design, 
packets transmitted using e2e design are sent and received “first-come, first-serve” 
regardless of the content it is transporting. Marsden notes “E2E is a two-edged sword, 
with advantages of openness and a dumb network, and disadvantages of congestion, 
jitter and ultimately a slowing rate of progress for high-end applications such as high 
definition video.”209 Pure end-to-end, first-come, first-serve transmission relying only on 
the basic TCP/IP protocols may be disastrous for more advanced and data-heavy 
applications.210 In some ways, the network congestion, which network operators argue 
justifies increasingly intrusive traffic management methods, is in part the result of the 
internet’s original e2e protocols.211 
To illustrate this, briefly consider how they may apply to a different form of 
traffic – auto traffic. Imagine a hypothetical highway between two cities that follows a 
pure e2e design. This highway would have no speed limits, no traffic signals, and no 
customs for managing traffic such as slower vehicles keeping in the outside lanes. If all 
vehicles traveling on the highway are relatively equal, they may all be able to travel 
more easily (and possibly efficiently) than on a managed highway. However, as 
different types of vehicles like large trucks (VoIP) or slower, heavy equipment 
(streaming video) enter the highway, the ability to use the road optimally will reduce. 
The only e2e solutions available would be to construct additional roads between the 
cities or widen the existing road (increase bandwidth.)  
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Because of these concerns, both neutrality supporters and opponents accept 
some degree of network management. Increasingly large and sensitive types of content 
and growing user numbers has warranted the need for new protocols for managing the 
internet. These new principles have increasingly become just as significant to the 
Internet as the e2e principles found within TCP/IP. But while these management 
protocols bring order to the potential chaos of a pure e2e network, they also open the 
door for potential abuse by network owners.  
3.2.2 Quality of service 
In response to the congestion of first-come, first-serve data transmission by the 
web’s original e2e protocols, network owners have increasingly implemented 
algorithms to manage data as it travels through their switches, servers and systems. 
These Quality of Service (“QoS”) protocols  preserve a basic expectation of service 
based on access to a given network and ensure traffic of greatly different needs is 
delivered successfully.212 With some web services (video streaming, large downloads, 
etc.) requiring more bandwidth than others, network owners argue they need tools to 
manage how bandwidth is used to ensure all customers receive a basic level of 
connectivity.213  
The specific types of QoS algorithms used have significant effects on the travel of 
data. Some may schedule how often certain types of data are allowed to move, others 
shape traffic by spreading packets rather than allowing them to come all at once, others 
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may block or prohibit certain types of traffic altogether.214 In that sense, some low-level 
content discrimination is already built into today’s internet networks. Today’s ISP 
routers are designed to prioritize (or buffer) certain types of traffic over others with 
time-sensitive packets, like video conferencing, are put ahead of regular traffic like 
visiting a website or watching a small video.215  
While some oppose any network discrimination, a basic level of QoS 
management is acceptable to most NN supporters, though the limits of what constitutes 
an “acceptable” management remains up for debate.216 Without some QoS management, 
data-intensive services (VoIP and Video Streaming) would be inefficient or impossible 
given the existing internet bandwidth for most users.217 For this reason, some argue 
traffic management and other QoS processes are vital to the continued innovation of the 
web and its increasingly central role in the midst of technological convergence.218  
Network providers and ISPs have invested heavily in technologies like Deep 
Packet Inspection (DPI) for transmitting, managing and identifying types of packets 
with increasing accuracy.219 These QoS technologies also give ISPs and networks tools to 
pick and choose some content over others. In an example from 2008, when the FCC 
responded strongly to Comcast’s data tracking and deliberately reducing of bandwidth  
(“throttling”) of Peer-to-Peer users, the company responded by instituting usage caps in 
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the name of QoS.220 Peha argues “it is cost-effective for a network operator to gain 
unprecedented knowledge about what is happening on the network, and to selectively 
improve or degrade service for some.”221 This may be as light as monitoring use to 
gather advertising information or as drastic as censoring certain content. Mueller and 
Asghari suggest the publicity from incidents like the Comcast case may lead to greater 
public scrutiny of ISPs and their monitoring, fostering reductions in the reported use of 
DPI technology.222  
As will be discussed below, these QoS technologies like DPI can be mobilized 
beyond commercial uses. They may also be used as tools for political surveillance and 
censorship. The accuracy of this technology allows ISPs to identify and slow politically 
sensitive or illegal data, or isolate user data for more accurate marketing or advertising.  
The emphasis by network owners on QoS echoes the initial concerns of telephone 
and telegraph networks concerned about the clarity of transmissions and methods for 
improving transmission rates and reducing congestion.223 The creation of ARPANET 
and its decentralized e2e transmissions was a radical shift from previous 
communication networks. Some have argued, dramatic increases in last-mile 
bandwidth may reduce or eliminate the need for service-management algorithms.224 
Despite this speculation, unless there is strong intervention from regulators or public 
outcry, there is little reason to believe technologies like DPI will become less prevalent 
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as network owners see opportunities to exert more control over networks. The historical 
pattern of network owners has been one of control, management and monetization 
rather than restraint. 
3.3 Infrastructure: the physical web 
Internet protocols may be different than those of previous communication 
technologies, they often travel on the infrastructure of legacy networks and the 
structure of these networks and their ownership has had significant effects on network 
neutrality. While today’s in the US is not dominated by a single monopoly like AT&T 
once dominated the telephone market, some have argued a similar level of network 
control now exists in the hands of a handful of broadband providers.225 Telephone-style 
network policies were designed with relatively consistent information loads, with the 
exception of a few dedicated lines. Users who needed more access to the phone network 
purchased more individual lines.  
In the 1970s with the advent of fax machines, telephone text transmission, and 
computer networking across telephone lines, new policies had to be created to deal with 
these new architectural needs. Any shift away from NN and flat rate pricing represents 
a shift away from how information networks have so far been regulated by the FCC.226 
As computer networks play an increasingly large role and as their infrastructure is 
adapted and updated to face increasingly large information and content loads, the 
legacy of previous structural and technology choices remains. 
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3.3.1 Connecting the tubes 
As discussed in chapter two, the expansion of these computer connections across 
phone lines was enabled by Carterphone and Hush-a-Phone rulings which allowed users 
and businesses to connect modems and computers directly to telephone networks and 
ultimately the internet. Previously these connections were only available to academic 
institutions and the largest corporations who leased access to the AT&T wires. In the 
wake of the 1984 break up of AT&T, interconnection allowed these connections to 
continue and flourish. The flexibility of TCP/IP networking meant many types of 
network technologies could be connected to other networks and ultimately to create a 
global internet. In the late 1970s and 1980s the majority of the internet consisted of 
university and government agencies, early consumer modems and internet services 
began to emerge.227  
In 1985, the National Science Foundation Network (NSFNET) was created to link 
academic supercomputers across the US using TCP/IP protocols and grew to become 
part of the foundation of the modern internet backbone.228 The network was dedicated 
to the distribution of research and scholarly work, built with a combination of public 
and private partnerships grew to reach across the country and grew to offer connections 
to 16 research institutions and multiple regional networks.229 In 1997 NSFNET was 
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privatized and replaced with connections to privately-operated backbone networks, 
and regional networks were replaced by regional ISPs.230 
The first consumer online service, CompuServe was launched in 1979 and 
offered basic text information, news and early email service to users who paid by the 
minute and connected through dial-up modems.231 Other consumer dial-up services like 
the UNIX-based USENET bulletin board service also began to grow in popularity 
during that time.232 Through the ‘80s and ‘90s Consumer internet access use continued 
to grow competition came from a variety of connection types including dial-up 
connections through telephone lines where customers could choose an ISP among a 
variety of providers, DSL which also operated on existing telephone network or cable 
internet which transmitted through existing cable television infrastructure.233  
Just as architecture allows certain types of behavior, policy is a reflection or 
rebuttal to these designs. The 2003 FCC Cable Internet Order that declared internet 
services operating on telephone lines as not subject to common carrier protections are 
one such example. While the flexibility of the web to adapt to a wide variety of already-
established communications networks has been a feature of internet technology, the 
historical regulatory approaches linked to those legacy networks has had a significant 
impact on network neutrality/open internet discussion. Questions of common carrier 
access or private network control have been raised about these legacy networks. While 
broadcast and cable networks have historically and legally been found to have a degree 
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of independence in content choice as far back as the Communications Act of 1934, 
likewise telephone and telegraph networks were held to non-discrimination rules like 
common carrier.234  
While Internet technology is sui generis, policy approaches to it reflect those 
made about previous technologies. Thus the NN debate, is in part about whether the 
internet communication networks are more similar to telecommunications networks 
(connecting users to users) or cable/broadcasting networks (connecting content 
providers to users.) The reality is much more complex. The Internet ‘s architecture 
reflects aspects of both of these and more. This is particularly apparent when looking 
beyond ISPs and users to the larger institutions and networks that make up the global 
Internet infrastructure. 
3.3.2 Interconnection and peering 
The physical connections and structure of the internet have continued to change 
as well, becoming increasingly sophisticated and complex. Most NN discussions have 
focused on the “last mile” or the connection between customers and the larger network. 
In the case of wired broadband in the US, these connections are largely through digital 
subscriber line (DSL) operating through telephone wires, coaxial (cable) connections, or 
fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP) service. The first two operate in part on the infrastructure 
of previous to-the-home technologies (cable television and telephone service) that have 
been adapted and upgraded to allow high-speed information transfer while the latter 
often requires brand-new infrastructure and connections to homes or businesses.  
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Figure 3.1 A diagram of complex infrastructure relationships. 
 
Beyond the “last mile” the network and its connections becomes much more 
complex (see Figure 3.1). Last-mile network operators (which are almost all now ISPs or 
companies connecting users to the larger internet-based network) are connected 
through fiber-optic cable to a variety of networks including other networks, often called 
the “middle mile.”235 The largest of these are Backbone (Tier 1) providers, including 
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AT&T, Verizon, Level 3 and TeliaSonera, which provide the largest, and longest 
connections across land and sea.236 Because they transmit huge, fairly equal amounts of 
data these Tier 1 providers connect and share data through free peering agreements.237 
Because they reach a smaller number of users, regional (Tier 2 or 3) networks, like 
Vodafone or even Comcast, may pay Tier 1 providers for access to their larger 
networks.238 These payments are called transit or interconnection agreements. 
While not classically regarded as NN, these agreements as well as the 
implementation of Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) ultimately affect the movement 
of information online, data congestion and ultimately the need for neutrality 
regulations. As CSPs have grown increasingly large and popular, they have 
increasingly relied on the implementation of CDNs or servers directly connected to 
backbone or ISPs that allow information to move directly within the ISP’s network 
instead of across potentially thousands of miles.239 In lieu of direct pricing tiers based on 
content users access, ISPs and CSPs have increasingly negotiated these partnerships for 
the heaviest or most time-sensitive online applications. Notable participants include 
Google, ESPN, Microsoft, and Netflix, the latter of which has publically opposed CDN 
pricing in a series of public dust-ups with both Comcast and Verizon.240 In part these 
public disagreements stem from content providers attempting to negotiate 
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interconnection with backbone providers like Cogent or Level 3 without brokering 
similar deals with last-mile ISPs. 
These agreements are potentially a strong deviation from the classic conception 
of fair and reasonable information transport.241 Because of the dearth of last-mile service 
providers, ISPs have incredible leverage to charge whatever they like in exchange for 
fast transport. Under this system, Marsden argues “content is therefore already 
delivered at different speeds depending on the paid priority the content provider 
assigns to it, but not the ISPs’ policies.”242 These CDN and interconnection agreements 
echo the programming negotiations between cable providers and content channels243 In 
fact, Comcast has leveraged its large infrastructure and huge last-mile user base to 
negotiate peering agreements with most Tier 1 networks and only pays a minor transit 
agreements fee for international connections.244 
Many (including open-internet advocates) argue CDNs add value to user 
experience online and for the most part do not negatively affect the last-mile of internet 
service.245 However, these agreements may endanger network neutrality in the long 
term. Feld argues premium service agreements and interconnection agreements rely on 
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bandwidth scarcity and therefore discourage ISPs from investing in faster networks.246 
Feld argues:  
The incentive for content providers and others to build CDNs and similar 
infrastructure is diminished if broadband access providers can block, degrade or 
prioritize the last mile traffic. Why bother to ship stuff express if it’s going to sit 
three days extra on the loading dock unless I grease the palms of the broadband 
access provider that’s supposed to deliver it?  Similarly, the incentive for 
broadband access providers themselves to invest declines when they can 
‘monetize the scarcity’ by charging more for prioritization.247 
 
These concerns as well as the previously-mentioned Netflix-Verizon dispute in 
the midst of the FCC’s 2014 reworking of its NN policies has led to FCC chairman 
Wheeler to announce the commission would examine the effects these negotiations and 
their impact on congestion for internet users.248 CDN agreements represent an 
increasingly significant change in the how traffic moves across the internet. With CDNs 
for the most popular sites, data is no longer travelling across great distances, but is 
instead cached in ISP servers near users. As demand for faster speeds increases, content 
providers are faced with brokering paid interconnection agreements with ISPs or face 
slower speeds. Holt argues these CDNs are effectively a loophole to neutrality rules:  
While technically legal, these payments certainly flout the spirit of the 2010 Open 
Internet Rules, which are intended to preserve a democratic Internet and 
maintain similar standards of service regardless of the senders’ ability to pay for 
a speedier delivery of their content at any point in the process. They also 
disadvantage smaller players who can ill afford to pay for this direct access, and 
consequently limit the range of creative possibilities for connected viewing.249 
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Without greater scrutiny of these practices or more robust network neutrality 
policies, infrastructure negotiations between the largest network and content providers 
may increasingly shape the content internet users access. Although many users in the 
US see little fixed broadband ISP competition, increased bandwidth through 
technological improvements may render concerns about congestion obsolete. 
3.3.3 The end of congestion? 
Dramatic changes in bandwidth capacity and traffic volume have become a 
staple of internet’s development. In part, network neutrality opponents argue this 
limited capacity warrants increasingly sophisticated tools for managing content and 
traffic. However, some suggest congestion concerns may be overstated. For example, 
Hass argues that while telecommunications service and IP service are dramatically 
different (particularly in how they allocate traffic across networks) – network owners, 
which are generally telecommunications companies, continue to pursue telecom 
solutions like price discrimination.250 Regardless of bandwidth improvements, dramatic 
increases in data compression and faster buffering may greatly reduce or greatly 
eliminate “congestion” as a justification for QoS tinkering or content discrimination by 
ISPs.251  
As globally networked information networks continue to evolve and legacy 
media moves to the IP network, the policies of network owners may move away from 
telecom-based business strategies. The growth of investment in last-mile FTTP 
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networks may bring much greater bandwidth to users and at least temporarily reduce 
concerns about last-mile congestion.  The expense of developing FTTP infrastructure 
may mean the total effects of this increased access may be far away. Nonetheless, 
roughly 22% of global internet users have fiber connections, a little over 19% use cable 
and the remaining 55% using copper or DSL connections according to the ITU’s 2013 
state of broadband report.252  
In the US, only about 10% of US households have direct FTTP connections; 
instead roughly 60% of households connect to the internet through cable with, 
according to the FCC’s 2014 Fixed Broadband Report.253 The popularity of cable internet 
systems has been in part due to the existing infrastructure which provides faster speeds 
than DSL, with lower overhead than building fiber networks. While fiber services like 
Verizon’s FiOS network have been plagued by expensive setbacks and criticism from 
investors less eager to invest capital in the costly network.254 
The expansion of new infrastructure with greater capacity may offer one 
architectural answer to network neutrality concerns. New entrants like Google and 
some municipalities have started to construct their own fiber networks and incumbents 
like AT&T have begun expanding FTTP access to users to keep up.255 This new 
competition from new fiber networks may pressure incumbent DSL and cable ISPs to 
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increase available speeds.256 The promise of an exclusively IP-based infrastructure could 
eventually bring potentially lower infrastructure costs and better service. Isenberg 
suggests the flexibility of IP to operate on any network with little intra-network 
modification is one of its strengths – and that will only increase as advanced IP-based 
networks expand.257  
3.4 Alternative approaches to architecture 
The versatility of basic internet protocols like TCP/IP have been able to span the 
world connecting diverse groups with access to many different technological systems. 
Lantham argues “the very nature of the Internet is relatively exceptional in 
telecommunications history because, as an internetwork, it directly and indirectly links 
a diverse range of not just national but subnational, regional, and global networks.”258 
Yet while these different places share common protocols, history, geography, 
economics, and politics have created sometimes widely different infrastructures.  
Noam argues there are relationships between the need for certain types of 
internet regulations and the economic/infrastructure development within countries. He 
argues countries with existing commercial/cable networks (the US, Canada, South 
Korea, and European areas like Switzerland and some Scandinavian countries) require 
additional investment in competing network technologies.259 In comparison, other less-
developed countries offering “a single-provider copper/DSL phone infrastructure” 
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should focus on the development fiber construction with policies encouraging open 
access.260 Unfortunately, infrastructure development plans are rarely simple.  
National broadband plans are not uncommon. According to the International 
Telecommunications Union over 134 countries had adopted national broadband plans 
by 2013 – these range from basic outlines of strategies for improving affordability, 
access, and speeds to more complex, multi-year complete overhauls of national 
infrastructure and policy.261 Some of the most prominent success stories of public 
broadband investment strategies include Japan and South Korea, which each boast over 
90% broadband penetration and lead OECD countries in fiber infrastructure.262 The 
expansion of the South Korean infrastructure is in part due to the country’s existing 
cable television coverage along with an $800 million USD infrastructure improvement 
investment plan completed in 2005.263 In Japan, fiber development has been ongoing 
since the 1990s and competitive unbundling policies (more on those in chapter 4) have 
been in place since 2001.264  It’s worth nothing that both South Korea and Japan have 
adopted policies regarding network neutrality and traffic management.265 Dense 
populations have made the rapid development of ultra-fast fiber infrastructure in these 
countries easier and more affordable.266 
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While the US internet infrastructure is largely the result of a long history public 
development (ARPANET and NSFNET) along with the connection to private networks 
like AT&T and cable operators, what affordances can be offered by designing and 
construction a new national broadband infrastructure today and can these 
infrastructures instill or preserve network neutrality? The examples of Australia and 
New Zealand illustrate particularly ambitious approaches to improving broadband 
systems. Each proposes to construct separate, ultra-fast fiber infrastructures to connect 
the majority of their respective residents.267  
3.4.1 Building from the ground up 
The following cases examines two particular projects – the National Broadband 
Network (NBN) in Australia and the Ultra-Fast Broadband (UFB) project in New 
Zealand which both seek to overhaul their respective countries broadband 
infrastructure to increase access and speeds. While both represent huge investments in 
time and capital to re-construct broadband access, they also show that network 
neutrality must be actively pursued rather than neglected in favor of fast connections.  
These new networks are being built in two countries where network neutrality is 
virtually non-existent. Instead, ISPs in Australia and New Zealand charge users based 
on usage or for a limited amount of content with data caps.268 Generally, both countries 
have favored infrastructure unbundling and ISP competition over more formal 
neutrality regulations.269 In fact, in 2008 a handful of Australian ISP leaders told the 
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online technology publication ZDNet that NN was an “American problem” created 
because US ISPs offered unlimited bandwidth instead of recouping costs through usage 
fees.270 In that interview, at least one ISP leader echoed the claim that fees were 
necessary to build faster networks, however the new government-funded broadband 
infrastructures in Australia and New Zealand may challenge that assertion. 
3.4.2 New Zealand 
New Zealand’s “Ultra Fast Broadband” invested an estimated $1.1 billion in US 
dollars on a ten-year plan to extend fiber to nearly 75 percent of the country’s 
residents.271 The plan involves a massive restructuring of the internet ecosystem in New 
Zealand. This includes splitting the deregulated, formerly state-run monopoly provider 
Telecom NZ into a new company Chorus to administer the new network that is 
available to competing ISPs.272 Also as part of the plan, these ISPs must adhere to a 
variety of transparency and non-discrimination requirements as the plan is 
implemented.273 
The construction of the fiber from homes to the network was undertaken by 
partnerships between the state-funded Crown Fibre Holdings company and a series of 
partnerships with private companies.274  Initially, the development of last-mile and 
backbone would be funded and constructed separately through these public-private 
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partnerships and ultimately operated separately in addition to retail ISPs – however it 
became clear to regulators in 2010 that separate markets for these two elements was 
unfeasible.275  Because of the cost to investors and complications of implementing this 
initial plan and the new strategy reduced the potential competition by making the 
networks more vertical.276 The country’s centralized broadband plan represents a 
rejection of privatization, in favor of the construction and ownership of a new state-
owned infrastructure.277  
While the development of fast fiber networks is ambitious, the prospects for the 
UFB’s success among users remains unclear. Conditions carried over from previous 
internet services threaten to slow or delay the benefits of fiber expansion in New 
Zealand. In particular, Dwayne Winseck notes the previous heavy use of expensive and 
restrictive bandwidth caps in New Zealand may discourage users from seeing the need 
to switch to faster fiber connections.278 While the country’s government continues to 
pursue strategies to convince customers to switch from DSL and copper connections to 
fiber, they have done little to address underlying concerns like such as content 
discrimination and onerous data caps.279 
3.4.3 Australia 
In Australia, a similarly ambitious plan is underway, but since its introduction in 
2007, the construction of the country’s National Broadband Network (NBN) has faced a 
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number of challenges.280 Geographically, extending broadband to citizens throughout 
the entire continent is a challenge – the plan is designed to construct FTTH in many of 
the most populated areas and wireless broadband or satellite connections to those in the 
remote Australian outback.281 In part, the government-backed and funded design offers 
the promise of connecting residents who otherwise would be too costly to connect to 
and therefore had been avoided by commercial networks.282 Like the New Zealand plan, 
the NBN provides wholesale infrastructure that will be sold to Australian ISPs like 
Telstra.283  
But the NBN construction and roll-out has been difficult. The projected 2007 cost 
of $4.7 billion is now estimated to be over $40 billion by the plans 2020 completion.284 By 
2013 the NBN had connected roughly 800,000 residents to the new network, expecting 
to reach a total of 3.5 million residents by 2015.285 The plan has also been plagued by 
ongoing negotiations with ISPs – namely by larger providers seeking better deals than 
smaller competitors. A change in government leadership has called into question the 
project’s direction and delayed finalizing regulations for the network’s governance.286 
While it is yet to be determined to what extent the NBN and its cooperating ISPs 
support network neutrality, measures enforcing copyright and online obscenity laws 
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online in the country have raised concerns about potential censorship for Australians.287 
While these types of laws are not abnormal, increasingly sophisticated technological 
tools are available to monitor and prevent undesirable activities online.  
The costly NBN rollout has also been politically divisive. While the project was 
designed and approved by the country’s center-left Labour part, a change in 
government to the leadership of the center-right Coalition party left the project in far 
less sympathetic hands.288 Though some Coalition leaders argued the project should be 
scrapped altogether, under Minister of Communications Malcolm Turnbull, NBN 
construction was continued but with some fiber-to-the-home construction instead 
reduced to fiber-to-the-node (or street corner) with copper connections made into 
homes.289 This decision, while more affordable in the short run may require more costly 
upgrades in the long run.290  
Interestingly, recent upheaval in US neutrality policy has drawn attention to the 
issue within Australia. In 2010, amid the early development of the NBN, there were 
calls, including from Google, for the country to clarify its position on neutrality as the 
US government had that year.291 The country has never formalized network neutrality 
and instead most ISPs offer explicitly non-neutrality “free zone” content like movie 
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downloads from the ISPs partners which don’t count against users’ metered download 
limits.292  
In the midst of this ongoing investment into fixed broadband, Australia has not 
climbed significantly in broadband penetration rankings and in fact, dropped slightly in 
global rankings due to faster growth in other countries.293 In 2013, roughly 26 percent of 
the population had access to fixed broadband internet – the NBN goal is to connect 93 
percent of Australians by 2020.294 
3.4.4 New networks, same problems 
Despite these ambitious broadband plans in both Australia and New Zealand, 
there appears to be little evidence of significant improvement in either’s broadband 
speed, access or affordability rankings which remain near the OECD average despite 
leading in per-capita investment.295  The lions share of broadband subscriptions in both 
countries continue to be DSL connections and both continue to have higher dial-up 
subscribership (around 10%) than other OECD countries (where the average is less than 
3%.)296 
It may be too soon to know the ultimate effects of these long-term plans if they 
are allowed to continue. Models in the EU and elsewhere of unbundling appear to be 
encouraging, particularly in creating competition among service providers. However, as 
Winseck noted in regards to New Zealand, it appears that fast networks alone are no 
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substitute for neutrality, particularly when burdensome data caps and existing 
content/ISP relationships potentially skew user adoption.297  
These examples call into question the claims by network owners in the US that 
non-neutral practices may be necessary to fund network expansion. Even as Australia 
and New Zealand fund and build new infrastructure, ISPs have continued to 
implement data caps and discriminatory policies. As these networks are completed and 
expanded and access to ultra-fast fiber networks and increased bandwidth becomes 
available, it remains possible that commercial or public interest in network neutrality 
will emerge.  
As slower DSL and dial-up are traded for fiber to the node or premises 
technologies, competing ISPs in Australia and New Zealand may feel pressure either 
from consumers or policymakers to offer more open, non-discriminatory service. In 
April 2014, at least one small Australian ISP began offering unlimited bandwidth as 
part of its fiber connection to the NBN system.298 Until these practices are more widely 
adopted, if ISPs are not willing to implement neutral practices despite the growing 
presence of ultra-fast fiber networks and heavily subsidized infrastructure, policies that 
promote open, equal access to web content should be adopted instead.   
3.5 Mixed signals: architecture as problem and solution 
The FCC’s network neutrality rulings have generally avoided technical NN 
rulings in favor of guiding principles and best practices for internet service providers. 
In part, this is because the structure and protocols of the web are often fast-changing 
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and the FCC has generally acted reactively, rather than proactively. Most recently, this 
slow movement can be seen in the growing attention to internet interconnection and 
peering agreements. While some argue these agreements should not be linked to the 
classical understanding of NN as regarding the last mile user service, the effects of these 
agreements may have a significant role in the issue’s outcome.299 
The FCC and regulators elsewhere in the world have generally shied away from 
architecture and technology-specific internet regulation. Instead, they have relied on 
policies emphasizing “openness” and “transparency” from network owners.300  For 
example, the Body for European Regulators of Electronic Communications (BEREC) has 
passed and encouraged policies focused on economic relationships rather than 
technology specifics by requiring greater network transparency and reinforcing the 
unbundling of network owners from ISPs.301 
Similarly, rather than technology or network-specific rules, the FCC’s policies 
have largely been based on transparency, vague terms regarding non-discrimination 
and openness. One the one hand, this can be seen as a move toward principle-based, 
rather than rule-based regulation. NN opponents often argue specific rule-based 
regulation of internet infrastructure would hamper future development and 
innovation.302 However, unclear regulations regarding network architecture have left a 
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great deal of flexibility to ISPs and increase the potential for rule-bending and abuse in 
the name of QoS.  
Political choices, economic opportunism, geography, technological innovation 
and sometimes chance have shaped the architecture used today. It has brought together 
legacy infrastructure from previous technologies with new innovations of content, 
programming and computing. As such, the conscious architecture choices moving 
forward should ideally reflect a reconciliation of the needs and desires of both the 
network managers and the public who uses and benefits from its existence and 
efficiency.  
While e2e networking is far from dead, the power of network owners as arbiters 
of limited bandwidth space puts them in a particularly strong position for steering the 
existing protocols by which the web operates and the physical infrastructure through 
which it travels.  In the US, this is exacerbated by the control of a handful of centralized 
DSL and Cable ISPs creating a bottleneck for users who are particularly susceptible to 
coercion, manipulation or abuse. Because of their size, it appears incumbent ISPs have 
little or no incentive to invest in infrastructure – some have argued this will only 
increase if regulators allow ISPs to increase revenue by content charges such as the 
FCC’s proposed “fast lanes.”303 As the largest ISPs increasingly integrate vertically with 
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content offerings becoming available online, the danger of discrimination toward 
competing content will intensify.304 
But the lessons gathered from the cases of Australia and New Zealand suggest 
that network neutrality does not naturally evolve from architecture, but is instead 
consciously coded and preserved. Although the growth of FTTP investment and 
construction by new entrants like independent municipalities and Google as well as 
incumbents like AT&T and Verizon may relieve some bandwidth scarcity concerns, 
demand for a fast, reliable web will only grow.305 While more utilities, products and 
services are moving online, the rapid development of data compression technology to 
reduce congestion and buffering may further reduce the congestion of time-sensitive 
and data-heavy traffic, but that remains to be seen.306  
As long as internet infrastructure is controlled by a relatively small handful of 
incredibly powerful gatekeepers, greater capacity should be seen as a substitute for 
neutrality policy. While architectural choices are powerful tools for regulating behavior 
online, the increasing complexity of global networks offers many opportunities for 
intervention. For that reason, other dimensions must be relied upon to help preserve 
and maintain network neutrality.   
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4     NEUTRALITY AND MARKETS 
This chapter examines two very different “market-friendly” approaches to 
neutrality regulation and their effects. In the US, direct policy has been traded policies 
designed to promote competition between platforms. The EU approach has favored 
promoting competition by allowing ISPs to operate across a single platform. Despite 
these efforts, there is little evidence that either approach has eliminated the need for 
neutrality regulation. Instead, they show the importance of neutrality policies for 
ensuring a more equitable competition in the internet ecosystem. 
4.1 The promise of competition 
While all four modalities have shaped network neutrality, none has received 
more attention than the role of markets in encouraging or discouraging online content 
discrimination. Terms like competition, monopoly, duopoly, unbundling, and vertical 
or horizontal integration have become commonplace in the discussion. During the early 
2000s, network owners and ISPs seemed to align with network owners and ISPs against 
and content providers and software corporations in favor of NN. In 2014, those lines are 
less clear.  
The most prominent anti-NN voices (including the majority of telecom operators 
themselves) argue: that network neutrality policies are unnecessary because they 
conflict with the free market competition among users, content providers and network 
providers and/or that existing competition is sufficient to prevent the dangers of non-
net neutrality. Despite these claims, there is little reason to believe current fixed 
broadband competition is robust enough to prevent non-discriminatory content 
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distribution. This threat of discrimination will only increase as ISPs and networks 
increasingly become content providers as well.  
Some in the United States have suggested regulators look to European Union 
ways to create more broadband competition. Despite EU unbundling policies 
encouraging greater market competition, reports of network discrimination and 
throttling continue.  
4.1.1 Changing markets 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the convergence of legacy information 
technologies onto a single internet platform and network has driven the network 
neutrality conversation.307 While this convergence is the result of new technological 
capabilities and capacity, it also marks a seismic shift in the information and 
communication technology and media markets. This has coincided with dramatic 
deregulation and integration where media organizations have taken advantage of less 
strict regulations and lowered cross-ownership barriers.308 While new technology 
companies have emerged during this period of rapid convergence and growth, many of 
the largest and most influential network owners and content distributers have their 
roots in older media like radio, television, and film.309  
The beginnings of internet deregulation were spurred in part by the growth of 
privately-owned cable distribution networks (upon which some of today’s last-mile 
internet communications travel) as well as political and economic trends toward 
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deregulation of communication industries in the US beginning in the 1980s.310  This 
culminated in the Communications act of 1996, which dramatically loosened the 
requirements on media and communications corporations.311 As the telecommunications 
and media industry has grown, so has their influence on policymaking and regulatory 
oversight, giving the industry powerful influence over the very regulators charged to 
oversee it.312 Today, telecommunications corporations are some of the largest campaign 
donors in the US and have spent significant funds lobbying against the implementation 
of any new network neutrality policies.313 
Network neutrality opponents argue that the dangers expressed by neutrality 
advocates have yet to materialize, and the instances which have come to light (for 
example, Comcast’s 2005 throttling of P2P users) are small exceptions, rather than an 
indicator of widespread ISP tactics. Both Yoo and Epstein argue ISP content 
discrimination practices should be investigated on a case-by-case basis, letting market 
forces and consumer demand control factors like pricing, bandwidth and competition.314 
The largest telecom opponents (Verizon, AT&T, and Comcast) have all opposed broad 
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calls by the FCC and others for restraint regarding network management, arguing these 
rules would be ineffective and potentially harmful to their business practices.315  
Not surprisingly, network owners and ISPs have stood in opposition to moves 
toward explicit net neutrality policies, citing proposed regulations as burdensome and 
potentially harmful to the Internet market. AT&T has warned network neutrality 
legislation may potentially reduce competition, compromise efficiency and prohibit 
operators from delivering performance-enhancing services.316 Furthermore, in the 
company’s 2013 annual report, AT&T claims the removal of the FCC’s 2010 Open 
Internet Order would offer new flexibility in managing its networks.317 
4.1.2 Making change under pressure 
As the FCC currently revising its policies on the matter, the agency is left with 
few options and it appears the US internet market is now farther, not closer to network 
neutrality policy. While the ruling left the agency authority to regulate, a decade of 
legal failures has left few options. One remaining option would be to reclassify internet 
traffic under existing “common carrier rules.” The telecom industry generally opposes 
any future FCC reclassification efforts that would include utility-style requirements 
designed for non-competitive industries. The National Telecommunications and Cable 
Association, one of the largest telecom lobbying organizations, argues network 
neutrality would “invariably stifle these investments by inserting the federal 
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government into the operation of broadband networks and the provision of broadband 
services.”318 In a May 2014 testimony before the US House of Representatives, FCC 
Chair Tom Wheeler faced questions regarding the agency’s ability to balance the 
internet’s market forces with potential regulation moving forward like reclassification.319 
Both during the hearing and in a submitted testimony, Wheeler stated the agency 
would review all available options for establishing open internet rules, while not ruling 
out reclassification measures.320 Moving forward, Wheeler and the FCC are in the 
uncomfortable position of crafting rules for all involved parties with few options 
remaining. 
The ongoing neutrality debate has involved the competing interests of major 
online influences including network owners, content producers and the larger online 
public. After years of debate there is a need for reconciliation that offers benefits to all 
involved in the internet ecosystem.321 However, as the stakes and profits of the internet 
economy grow exponentially, the network neutrality debate has become a fight 
between the titans of old and new media for control of the web.    
4.2 Power over pipes  
The internet market in the US (if it can even be described as such) encompasses a 
variety of corporations and organizations ranging from those with legacies extending 
back over 100 years, to others in their infancy. The existing market conditions have 
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resulted in ISPs standing increasingly as gatekeepers to the online world. This uneven 
playing field makes NN regulations vital for the future of the web. From a markets 
perspective, NN can be seen as a corporate power struggle between established, 
incumbent network owners and ISPs like AT&T, Comcast and Verizon with long-
established influence and increasingly powerful and popular content and application 
companies like Google, Facebook, and Netflix.322 However, as these large corporations 
increasingly integrate both horizontally and vertically, the line between these groups 
and the trajectory of the network neutrality debate will continue to shift. 
4.2.1 Gatekeepers to the web 
The US market positions of ISPs and their respective networks are largely a 
product of their non-internet origins and a pattern of media deregulation over the last 
30 years. The result is a market dominated by a handful of the largest DSL and Cable 
providers with marginal competition from smaller providers. An ongoing series of 
mergers and acquisitions has increasingly narrowed the number of ISPs available – 
these include the acquisition of TCI’s cable distribution systems by Comcast and the 
steady re-unification of the “baby bells” which were separated in the 1980s break-up of 
AT&T’s telephone monopoly.323 Because of these acquisitions as well as the presence of 
usually just one telephone and cable provider for most cities, the majority of Americans 
have few options for broadband service providers – raising the possibility of market 
manipulation.324 The size and influence of these ISPs has played a particularly 
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significant role in their ability to negotiate content agreements in cable, and increasingly 
are used to leverage power online as well.325 
The economic considerations of ISPs are complex. They operate as the 
intermediaries of a two-sided market in which they negotiate with other networks (and 
large content providers) as well as end-users.326 The product they provide – broadband 
connections – rely not only on the existing infrastructure, but the ongoing traffic that 
travels across it. These organizations argue that in order to keep up with increasing 
demand and network expansion they need a variety of tools to both recoup these costs. 
This means potentially charging customers and CSPs differently based on how they use 
the networks.327 But regulators, network operators and civil society groups have found 
little common ground on what amount of pricing and content discrimination should be 
considered reasonable for network management.328  
The NN conversation has largely focused on the extent to which ISPs should be 
allowed to manage or block traffic across the “last mile” of their networks. Given a lack 
of service provider competition for US users, ISPs are increasingly the singular 
intermediary (and potential gatekeeper) between users and content providers. This 
holds potential for abuse.329 Some argue heavy use by a small number of users should be 
penalized, since it burdens the network for others, though this has largely been 
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addressed through tiered speeds, and limited use of data caps.330 To discourage the 
heaviest users, ISPs, including AT&T and Comcast, have incrementally instituted data 
caps, which they claim affect only a small percentage of users.331 The FCC’s 2010 Open 
Internet Order did not prohibit these measures or speed tiers and usage-based pricing, 
however it did prohibit paid prioritization of content.332 Paid prioritization would mean 
content providers or applications (or the ISP itself) could pay ISPs to reach customers 
faster or more reliably or potentially degrading the quality of other non-paying traffic. 
Neutrality opponents and ISPs argue policies like the 2010 Open Internet Order 
(and other neutrality measures) are impractical barriers to future internet business 
models.333 They say networks and service providers should be allowed to test new 
market approaches, pricing models, and network management initiatives, which 
neutrality rules prohibit.334 In the wake the 2014 Verizon ruling it is unclear to what 
extent any FCC rule revisions will continue to prevent ISPs from creating new forms of 
pricing. Until more strict policies are legislated or more drastic neutrality regulations 
(such as reclassifying internet service to be under common carrier rules) it is likely 
network owners and ISPs will continue to pursue these strategies. Early internet service 
was largely held to the same common carrier standards in place for telephone 
communications, but in the early 2000s the FCC under the Chairman Michael Powell 
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ruled that the networks had common with private cable networks than the 
telecommunications networks of the past and thus were not afforded common carriage 
protection.335  
In light of enormous profit margins of the internet service divisions of ISPs and 
network owners, that these calls for pricing and discrimination flexibility have less to 
do with network investment, and more to do with growing their profit margins.336 In 
fact, the reported revenue of the four largest US broadband providers (AT&T, Verizon, 
Comcast and Time Warner Cable) have increased while their spending on capital 
expenditures like network upgrades has largely remained steady (see Figure 3.) – all 
while the number of broadband users has increased.337  
In other words, broadband providers are making more money and serving more 
customers without spending more on networks. While networks claim the network 
neutrality rules discourage investment, the reduction in capital expenditures from these 
providers began long before the 2010 Open Internet Order and has not seen a marked 
reduction since the rules were instituted.338 
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Figure 4.1 Five-year intervals of broadband revenue and capital investment (Data source: Crawford and 
Shapiro, “Capex&Revenue_2001-2013 - Google Sheets”) 
 
Feld argues processes like broadband pricing tiers and “premium service” add 
little value to the network itself while users pay ISPs higher prices or risk slower 
access.339 With ISP average revenue per user margins dwarfing those of CSPs (In 2013, 
Google profited $11 per user, while Comcast made $323), it makes little sense for 
content companies to subsidize infrastructure construction and in fact, ISPs would be 
incredibly averse to slowing any content if markets were reasonably competitive.340  The 
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corporations who own increasingly large swaths of internet infrastructure may have 
great incentives to take advantage of their powerful position. Wu notes: “it doesn’t take 
a genius to realize that if AT&T and the cable companies exercised broad discretion to 
speed up the business of some firms and slow down that of others, they would gain the 
power of life and death over the Internet.”341 Network neutrality is a necessary tool for 
fighting the outsized market power of US network providers. That need for neutrality is 
particularly clear when examining how ISPs have used their position when dealing 
with online content providers. 
4.3 Content held captive 
In the past 20 years there has also been an explosion of content and applications 
needing more bandwidth and faster download and upload speeds across the network. 
Simple landing pages with a minimum number of images have been replaced by 
streaming video, streaming audio, complex interactive applications and online 
ecosystems that demand greater resources and nearly instantaneous transmission to 
function.342 This shift has led to a change in behavior online from users visiting a large 
number of unique webpages to the majority of web traffic passing through a handful of 
the most popular search engines, entertainment sites, and social networks.343 This 
growing and influential segment of the internet market relies on fast, ubiquitous 
broadband connections to exist and until recently content providers have taken a 
substantial role in promoting network neutrality.  
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Content providers online range dramatically in scale from the individual owner 
of small, seldom-visited website to multi-billion dollar online media corporations like 
Amazon, Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Netflix, and Apple. The actual content provided 
is as often as diverse as the web itself. Whether professionally produced or user created, 
a large portion of today’s internet content requires speedy, seamless broadband 
connectivity.344 In July 2014, a list of the most popular websites globally were dominated 
by search engines (led by Google), social networks (led by Facebook) and video 
streaming websites (led by YouTube.)345  
While these website and applications are popular, they rely on broadband 
networks to access users, content, and revenue. The institution of neutrality policies by 
the FCC are in part a response to anti-competitive actions by ISPs who have exploited 
their role in the internet market to help or hurt content online. The sheer scale of 
internet providers that have been allowed to merge and grow in the de-regulated US 
media market has intensified this. In particular, network providers have focused on 
three types of internet traffic: peer-to-peer file sharing, Voice over IP (VoIP), and video 
streaming.346 
While a wide variety of internet content is available legally, like YouTube, 
Netflix, Spotify and Hulu, the decentralized and unlimited duplication of media online 
has undermined a previously significant source of revenue for media companies. This 
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has drawn the attention of the media companies and regulators.347 A community of 
online users illegally sharing digital versions of these media through a variety of 
simple, largely-anonymous tools including peer-to-peer sharing, linking websites and 
cyber lockers.348 This has drawn the attention of both media corporations and 
regulators. In 2005, Comcast was fined by the FCC for repeatedly slowing the traffic of 
peer-to-peer users on the suspicion that those users were illegally sharing files  – a clear 
violation of network neutrality principles.349 In addition to ISPs have also taken actions 
to discriminate against online content that competes with legacy technologies.  
VoIP offers a similar service to audio telephone communication, but uses IP 
protocols to translate and transmit these voice messages over the internet rather than a 
separate network. These services require faster, more reliable service than websites, and 
are thus also more sensitive to traffic management by ISPs.350  Because many DSL and 
cable broadband providers also offer voice services, there is an incentive for them to 
slow or block competing VoIP services to their customers.351 However, VoIP also creates 
competition new with the existing phone serve many network providers already offer. 
In 2004, the FCC opened an investigation against Madison River Communications that 
blocked Vonage’s VoIP service to its customers.352 Madison River argued it blocked the 
sites based on network management needs, however the presence of a competing 
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service being sold by the company appeared to show a conflict of interest.353 After some 
investigation, Madison River agreed to stop blocking VoIP services and offered a 
voluntary payment in exchange for the case being dropped.354  
While the FCC has made high-profile investigations of blocking against VoIP 
providers, in many other places in the world slowing and blocking of these services is 
not uncommon, though regulators usually argue this based on network strain, rather 
than market competition.  For example, as recently as 2009 South Korea restricted VoIP 
services except those offered by the preferred South Korean carrier.355 The Netherlands, 
one of the first countries to codify strong, formal network neutrality laws, considers 
VoIP and some streaming video differently from less data-intensive Internet traffic.356 
Video traffic is also regarded differently from other web services, though the 
threat of video content discrimination is increasingly seen as a market competition, 
rather than a technical matter. In part, this is the result of the slow shift of video services 
from traditional television technologies like over-the-air and cable to streaming online. 
As the technological capacity for streaming video has improved, so have video content 
producers increasingly shifted content online.357 Recently, media institutions from 
around the world have scrambled to capture the interest and eyes of online viewers.358 
These include traditional media producers and television studios as well as new tech 
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companies seeking to compete with these legacy producers for the new online 
territory.359 While this video programming exists on the new internet platform, the tools 
for financing these endeavors uses many of the same strategies as previous forms of 
media including relying on: single purchases, (iTunes and Amazon), advertising 
(YouTube), subscriptions (Netflix and Amazon Prime), or a combination of the three 
(Hulu.)360 
The rise of “cord cutters” (consumers replacing cable television service with 
online video streaming) has raised the interest of cable providers. In response to this, 
vertically integrated ISPs who also provide cable video services, have a strong incentive 
to block or slow competing video traffic or offer faster select content as part of their 
cable services.361 However, network neutrality rules have generally stood in the way of 
this. In a 2014 interview, Former FCC chairman and current president of the National 
Cable and Telecommunications Association, Michael Powell denied this, arguing only a 
small percentage of consumers are technically “cord cutters.”362 Yet despite these claims, 
the rise of a handful of new competitors into the video market has drawn the attention 
of the cable industry and intensified the neutrality debate. Video providers like 
Comcast have invested heavily in streaming video services like the company’s TV 
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Everywhere service that allows cable customers to stream television programming 
online as part of cable subscriptions.363  
One online video service, Netflix, has been particularly vocal about the need for 
network neutrality to preserve online video streaming. Netflix, which originally 
provided subscription DVD rentals by mail before shifting to offering subscription 
online video streaming, has grown to being responsible for a large portion of peak 
internet traffic in the US.364 In the wake of the 2014 Verizon decision, some speculated 
that cable companies and ISPs may take the opportunity to throttle Netflix content in 
exchange for payment or carriage agreements.365 However, in Netflix’s January 2014 
letter to investors, the company argued its popularity with consumers would likely 
prevent any overt blocking or throttling.366 This appeared to only be partially true.  
4.3.1 Backdoor deals to defeat neutrality 
With the 2014 NN debate and FCC rule revision in the background, Netflix 
participated in a number of high-profile negotiations and disputes with ISPs including 
Comcast and Verizon over interconnection agreements.367 Ultimately, Netflix reached 
agreements with these ISPs; but it remains unclear to what degree the NN debate 
served as a bargaining chip for Netflix in the negotiations or whether the 
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interconnection debate is a proxy war for the larger discussion about balancing CSP and 
ISP power. Following this public disagreement, the FCC has vowed to examine 
interconnection more closely, which may affect future neutrality regulation. 
Nonetheless, the debate raised scrutiny about the otherwise complex and under 
examined role of interconnection and peering in the internet debate and their 
implications on the larger internet market.368 
Increasingly content agreements and interconnection deals are used by ISPs as a 
way to circumvent neutrality rules. Beginning in 2012, Comcast allowed the streaming 
of video through the company’s Xfinity On Demand service over Xbox to not count 
against user data caps, while other services like Netflix and HBO Go continued to 
count.369 Comcast has argued this discrimination is acceptable because its CDN 
agreement with Microsoft means this streaming is not happening over the internet (and 
subject to NN) but instead is merely an exchange between Comcast’s own servers and 
its users.370 
The largest CSPs may be able to afford to negotiate cable-like carriage fees with 
ISPs and network owners, small and mid-size companies would potentially be at a clear 
disadvantage.371 For this reason, the largest companies may not be eager to enter the 
network neutrality debates. Crawford argues these major internet companies actually 
have strong leverage against internet providers – just as the most popular cable 
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television channels (like ESPN) have strong leverage over cable companies.372 She 
argues “Facebook and Google are powerful enough that the providers need them more 
than they need the cable guys. So they know they’ll be able to make all the deals they 
want. They’re not so worried about the fate of the next Google, or the next Facebook.”373 
As Google has grown, so has its role in the network neutrality debate. In 2005, 
Vinton Cerf, one of the developers of TCP/IP, a Google Vice president and the 
company’s “Chief Internet Evangelist” testified to the US House of Representatives on 
the benefits of network neutrality and the merits of non-discrimination.374 In 2006, he 
again argued on Google’s behalf to congress that the openness of the internet has led to 
its success and growth. Yet in 2010, the company’s position appeared to budge – it 
announced a policy proposal agreement with Verizon that recommended neutrality on 
existing platforms, but opened the potential for new pricing approaches to “new 
technologies.”375 While Google has signed a petition supporting FCC action in 
supporting network neutrality, the company has maintained a lower visibility in the 
2014 debate than in previous years.376 In part, this may be a result of Google’s own 
increasing investment in internet infrastructure through Google Fiber and it’s 
investment in the wireless Android smartphone market.377 
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The combination of content and infrastructure is particularly salient both as a 
tool for maximizing distribution as well as controlling the possibility of losses through 
illegal file sharing and copyright infringement. Neutrality policies balance the power 
between ISPs and content providers by offering relatively equal footing for emerging 
companies who otherwise would have little leverage to gain access to networks.378 Some 
have suggested that without neutrality rules, emerging online services like cloud 
storage and computing – which require nearly instantaneous access to servers over the 
web -- could become prohibitively expensive without some expectation of fair pricing 
and treatment.379 While pricing freedom and content discrimination may offer network 
owners and operators profits and possibly revenue for network investment, Van 
Schewick argues the potential market damage to innovation and applications online 
would be costly to society.380 
4.3.2 Size matters: vertical integration and neutrality 
In many ways, the increasing vertical integration between ISPs and CSPs may be 
one of the gravest threats to the current status of network neutrality. As networks 
integrate internally-produced or owned content into their services, existing CSPs 
become direct competitors. The following is a hypothetical nightmare scenario for 
unrestricted vertical integration with no network neutrality: “ISP X” is the sole cable ISP 
in a city and offers a streaming video service (ISP X Video) that competes with “CSP Z.” 
Without some form of net neutrality expectation, ISP X could charge its customers an added fee 
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to access CSP Z while offering “ISP X Video” for free. Without ISP competition, users would 
have little or no access to CSP Z’s content without paying more. ISP X could also potentially 
negotiate fees to make CSP Z’s content available to ISP X users for free again. In this scenario, 
the ISP becomes the ultimate arbiter of what content its users can access and has an 
incentive to only offer the content that will bring in the most profits.  
For now, it appears policies, rather than the market has discouraged the worst of 
these potential scenarios, but in the wake of the 2014 Verizon ruling, the potential for 
this level of ISP intervention remains far from impossible. But despite the potential for 
the largest ISPs and vertically-integrated media corporations to exploit their market 
position, these organizations have seen a mixed track record – the failed merger of AOL 
and Time Warner being a prime example. Grove and Baumann argue corporations 
attempting to integrate content and infrastructure have underperformed.381 They argue 
this is partially because the business models and technical needs of each of these 
businesses are dramatically different – causing slow, and troubled integration 
processes, but potential for long-term success.382 The investors and owners of these 
organizations are leery of expensive, long-term investments with unreliable payoff – 
they argue the threat of an internet dominated by vertically-integrated corporations 
(with some exceptions) remains generally remote.383  
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However, the 2011 union between Comcast and NBC Universal has already 
proved to be more successful than the AOL-Time Warner predecessor.384 The newly-
acquired content from NBC-Universal gave Comcast a powerful bargaining chips when 
negotiating with both television programming companies and distribution networks.385 
In other words, because of Comcast’s vast cable infrastructure – it could negotiate 
favorable agreements with programming companies; because of its valuable 
programming (NBC and its affiliates) it could secure lower fees from competing cable 
providers.  
In fact, it is this cable-style negotiating tactics that NN proponents fear.386 
Applied to the internet, cable-style negotiating would mean ISPs may charge CSPs 
carriage fees based on their popularity. Alternatively, ISPs may institute data caps, but 
allow some content providers to not count against these caps, provided they’ve 
negotiated an agreement with the ISPs – a practice increasingly common on non-neutral 
wireless networks.387 While this may set a dangerous precedent on wireless networks, 
they are far more competitive than wireline broadband – where there is far less 
competition between ISPs.388 
In 2014, Comcast offered to buy Time Warner Cable (the cable provider/ISP was 
spun-off from AOL Time Warner) and its millions of subscribers would potentially only 
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increase the company’s power to negotiate with content providers (and users) - if not 
through non-neutral pricing, then through largely under-regulated interconnection, 
peering and CDN agreements.389 Time will tell whether regulators allow the largest and 
second-largest cable broadband networks become a single super-provider. The merger 
would only further reduce the number of US broadband providers and perhaps more 
significantly increase Comcast’s already immense market leverage against content 
providers. With the power imbalances between networks and content providers only 
become greater, network neutrality and non-discrimination rules in the US should be 
seen as preserving market competition rather than inhibiting it. 
4.4 Neutrality in the European Union 
Both the US and the EU have wrestled with appropriate tools for addressing 
online competition, yet the two have approached the issue very differently.390 In part, 
this is because each have different histories, political/cultural climates and governance 
structures. Rather than passing explicit continent-wide network neutrality rules, 
European regulators have instead opted for a series of regulatory measures focused on 
promoting broadband transparency and competition rather than explicit policy 
prohibitions.  
While European homes only have access to single fixed telecommunication 
network, competition access to infrastructure through local loop unbundling (LLU) has 
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created opportunities for broadband competition.391 In contrast, U.S. households often 
have internet access through both cable and telephone providers, but operate within a 
largely duopolistic market. Because of these differences, the reinforcement and 
maintenance of this unbundling has taken priority over more specific regulations on 
networks and ISPs.  
4.4.1 Crafting neutrality through markets? 
The European Commission, the executive and law-proposing body of the 
European Union, Internet regulations have attempted to balance defending public 
access rights, preserving European culture and promoting European content creators.392 
Beginning with a framework in 2002, EU legislators took steps were to promote non-
discriminatory actions by ISPs and general Internet quality of service. Since then 
attempts have been made to balance increased QoS standards for applications without 
further burdening ISPs and also working with existing national regulatory policies.393 
The 2002 directive asked that member nations follow a series of steps to analyze current 
practices and encourage broadband providers in each step to take steps increasing 
competition and transparency based on each country’s specific conditions.394 The 2002 
EU policy relied almost exclusively on market competition measures rather than 
explicitly network neutrality rules.395 
In 2011, the European Commission reexamined the issues surrounding open 
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internet and Net Neutrality in further depth. The subsequent report emphasized the 
EU’s need for “more stringent measures to achieve competition and the choice 
consumers deserve.”396 The Commission pledged to address strains on existing 
networks by working with EU member states and stakeholders to encourage the 
development of broadband to relieve bandwidth pressure.397 
Much of the information informing the European Commission’s policies on 
Internet access, traffic and speeds has been gathered by the Body of European 
Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), a board composed of the heads of 
National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) that monitor communication markets, services 
and networks.398 Past recommendations on net neutrality from BEREC have drawn 
attention from organizations such as the Internet Society, which praised the board’s 
October 2011 recommendations for clear definitions of Internet service, transparency in 
monitoring connection speeds, bandwidth, and access.399 
A 2012 BEREC report indicating the status of Internet practices and restrictions in 
Europe showed nearly one in five EU broadband users was subject to some form of 
network neutrality violations.400  In response, the organization suggested more 
competition should be the main tool for disciplining ISPs with user transparency a must 
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for maintaining fair competition.401 That report also noted existing regulatory tools (like 
clear rules regarding acceptable QoS measures) should be adequate for addressing net 
neutrality concerns unresolved by market forces. Marcus, Nooren, Cave, and Carter 
recommend the EU maintain existing NN regulations which upheld existing QoS rules 
while monitoring for neutrality complaints, usually the throttling of p2p and VoIP 
users.402 Despite these basic network neutrality framework and subsequent statements 
supporting neutrality in the region, the EU continues to defer to market self-regulation 
or jurisdiction of member country NRAs and legislation.  
While unbundling is more common in the EU, the level of scrutiny placed on 
European telecom corporations depends on the whims of the European Commissioners 
and European Parliament, however in the wake of the 2014 US setbacks, neutrality 
proposals in Europe appear to be reinvigorated.403 A more robust set of regulations in 
Europe called “ConnectedContinent” has been slowly introduced and moved through 
the EU governmental system.404 After five years of development, the EU Parliament 
passed a version of the network neutrality bill in April 2014 after several rounds of 
debate which removed a provision for allowing “specialized services” and establishing 
stronger NN rules for both wireline and wireless networks including “a clear and 
binding definition of Net Neutrality and prohibitions against blocking, throttling and 
other forms of discrimination from Internet service providers.”405 Since then, the bill has 
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faced much strong opposition from European telecommunications companies, members 
of the European Commission and member states and may be delayed until as late as 
2016.406   
4.4.2 Making rules for a diverse region 
Attempts to manipulate markets to create a more neutral internet through 
unbundling have been somewhat effective, but structural measures elsewhere have also 
created similar results. For example, the equal distribution of high-speed cable and fiber 
optic Internet technology in South Korea appears to discourage content discrimination; 
in Germany, a market dominated by the single provider Deutsche Telekom, 
government attempts at decoupling have been attempted, but have largely been 
unsuccessful, leading to repeated attempts at creating alternate policies to ensure 
network neutrality compliance from the country.407  
However, in the decade since the EU’s light-handed competition and 
unbundling-based approach have been adopted, the overall effects of fostering a 
neutrality climate are unclear. Broadband adoption in the EU continues to grow, though 
that growth appears vary widely from country to country. Since 2004, fixed broadband 
penetration in the EU has grown from around 4% to nearly 25% yet only 5% of the 
population has access to fast-broadband (over 30 Mbps.) and many of those are located 
in a handful of countries.408 The majority of EU broadband customers continue to 
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connect via DSL through copper phone lines, though in some places like Romania and 
Belgium over 50% of subscriptions are for ultra-high speed fiber connections.409  
Despite competition and transparency rules, accusations of heavy-handed 
network management techniques by ISPs persist.410 Because of this and a political 
movement to develop a clearer region-wide broadband development climate and 
policies, support has grown for more explicitly neutrality policies.411 If passed, measures 
such as those proposed by the European Parliament in 2014 may more clearly align the 
various member state policies ranging from explicit rules to industry self-regulation.412 
Member-state policies regarding neutrality range from the strong support like 
the Netherlands, to some echoing the official EU position, and five smaller members 
that had taken no clear position on the issue.413 While many EU countries including 
France and Sweden have taken steps toward supporting network neutrality, in 2012 the 
Netherlands became the first European country to adopt its own formal laws banning 
the blocking or levying of additional fees for the use of Internet communication services 
by mobile telephone operators.414 For some European countries, passing neutrality laws 
internally may be politically easier and faster than waiting for continent-wide 
regulations.  
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4.5 Different approaches, different results 
In the most basic sense, the unbundling approach adopted in much of the EU is 
designed to foster market competition by offering multiple service providers to 
compete across a single infrastructure. In comparison, the US approach allows multiple 
different technologies to be constructed and compete with each other for users. In both 
approaches, policy is used to cultivate different market approaches.  
The effects of the different approaches on the larger internet markets are unclear 
– each afford different benefits and consequences for both the US and EU. For example, 
since 2007 annual infrastructure spending per-household in the US is nearly double that 
of the EU, raising the possibility that the unbundling approach discourages 
investment.415 However, the cost of high-speed internet service (30 Mbps+) is also 
generally lower in the EU than that of the US.416 Not only that, but according to the ITU, 
nine of the top 10 countries with the highest broadband penetration are within the 
EU.417  
The range of speeds, investment and fixed broadband technologies vary greatly 
between EU member nations and the EU average is not particularly informative for 
comparison.418 The telecommunications markets in Europe countries (many of which 
have recently-deregulated national telecom monopolies) often resemble each other 
more than the US system.419 While the effects of these two approaches can be compared, 
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there are some limitations to what they tell us. In part, this is because the multi-state 
composition of the EU offers a huge range of business climates and populations 
compared to the US.   
While ISP competition may be viable in many European countries where a 
centralized infrastructure allows for easier service unbundling, the size and influence of 
telecommunications corporations, the wide variety of different infrastructures, and the 
lack of interest by regulators and legislators in major overhauls means the chances of 
similar unbundling in the US is unlikely. 
4.5.1 The dream of a market solution 
The economic implications of network neutrality have made it a popular subject 
for analysis, but much of the impact relies on speculation and projections about the 
impact of future neutrality regulations. Generally, some flexibility for pricing, network 
management, caps and tiered service are accepted in the internet economy; however 
more dramatic requirements on pricing, content discrimination or the reclassification of 
internet communication as common carriers may lead to unexpected results.420  
Although they argue their role is maintaining competition between companies 
online, US regulators like the FCC, FTC, and Justice department have recently avoided 
dramatic interventions.421 Under the banner of competition and openness, the FCC 
policy has nominally supported the issue with a handful of “open internet” orders, but 
offered relatively few consequences if they were violated.422 Recently, the FCC’s most 
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powerful tool for maintaining NN has been through its oversight role over the mergers 
of media companies.423 As an arbiter of the “public interest,” the commission has 
secured temporary non-discrimination agreements as stipulations for several corporate 
mergers including AT&T. A three-year commitment to preserving network neutrality 
on AT&T’s networks was one of the final conditions required by the FCC before the 
company’s merger with former “baby bell” Bellsouth.424 Likewise, Comcast’s merger 
with NBC-Universal was approved pending a multi-year neutrality commitment.425 
Recently, two announced mega-mergers between Comcast-Time Warner Cable and 
AT&T-DirectTV – if approved, are expected to include ongoing network neutrality and 
transparency requirements.426  
As the FCC reassesses its approach to the issue following the 2014 Verizon 
ruling, the European approach to fostering neutrality through market competition 
offers key lessons for US policy moving forward. In particular, the movement to create 
more explicit network neutrality policies in Europe, despite existing transparency and 
competition measures may be a sign of the limitations of market-based competition to 
reach an ideal level of non-discrimination protection.  
Comparisons between the US and EU have not been uncommon. Notably, 
during the last FCC net neutrality rulemaking process, a series of academics published 
an op-ed in The New York Times suggesting regulators mirror the EU approach of 
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increased transparency. They claimed:  
Before the commission embraces regulation, it should take another look at the 
European model and focus on a policy built on transparency. […]Under the new 
European rules, providers are required to inform customers of any limitations 
that they impose on access, or on the use of services and applications, including 
bandwidth caps. […]This represents a vote of deserved confidence regarding the 
effectiveness of Europe’s current competition policy as well as the evolution of 
pricing, competition and investment in the industry. Europe already has all the 
tools needed to address lapses in competition if they occur.427 
 
Similar calls for transparency are in many ways the most market-friendly and 
politically-feasible approaches for addressing content discrimination by ISPs, but as the 
EU shows, they have had limited success and may be abused.428 They often rest on the 
theory that a more transparent, informed marketplace will more informed and efficient 
decisions, but this becomes complicated as the limitations of visibility (regarding 
sometimes incredibly technical information) and provides few solutions in markets 
with little or no competition.429 Complex interconnection and peering agreements are 
playing an increasingly significant role in how online content flows, and while they 
have not traditionally been a part of network neutrality regulations, increased 
transparency in regards to how these agreements are brokered and executed could 
potentially preempt the need for ex post regulation.  
Neutrality advocates have called for greater transparency requirements, 
particularly for those demanding greater details regarding ISP interactions and 
interconnections. While the transparency aspects of the FCC’s Open Internet Order 
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were not dismissed in the Verizon ruling, the information reported to the commission is 
fairly limited and could be expanded to include more detailed reporting on 
interconnection agreements, ongoing speeds reports, and more detailed reporting on 
the speeds customers encounter.430 
4.5.2 When markets don’t lead 
While US network operators hold particularly strong positions and near-
monopoly power, they still compete to some degree with both traditional and emerging 
technologies. Their influence will only increase without some form of network 
neutrality policy to enforce equitable market relationships online. However, the 
tenuous balance between online content providers and network owners is threatened as 
the largest CSPs also have the ability to protect themselves from future competition by 
working with those who provide the pipes.  
There appears to be little momentum in the US towards Euro-style unbundling 
that would allow ISPs open access to compete for access to users. Instead, entrenched 
network owner/operators operate with little or no competition and little incentive to 
invest in faster infrastructure, despite huge profits. In a climate of little or no broadband 
competition, network neutrality rules attempt to establish some level of reasonable 
competition by competition by limiting the ability for ISPs to exploit their market 
position through content and price discrimination. While the FCC’s 2010 attempt to 
maintain competition through neutrality has been dismissed, the Verizon ruling did 
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leave the possibility of drastic regulatory action: reclassification of internet service as a 
utility.431 
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5     NEUTRALITY AND NORMS 
The following chapter discusses the normative aspects of network neutrality. In 
particular, the following three cases show how community consensus or lack thereof 
may prevent the wider adoption of neutrality norms. First, it examines how the long 
legacy of common carriage has influenced network neutrality norms even beyond the 
removal of common carriage rules from internet service. Next, the chapter highlights 
the emergence and resonance of the values of openness and independence associated 
with the internet and how divisions between those values may affect the adoption of 
neutrality norms to a wider community online. Finally, it highlights how divisions 
within international governance meetings and the proposal and supporting of network 
neutral or non-neutral principles reveal the challenges facing the potential adoption of 
wider network neutrality norms. 
5.1 The end of the internet? 
The provocative headline “We’re About to Lose Net Neutrality — And the 
Internet as We Know It,” in the magazine Wired claimed a 2013 challenge to the FCC’s 
2010 Open Internet Order would end content non-discrimination online in the US and 
by extension, drastically alter the internet.432 Only a few months later, the 2014 Verizon 
case was decided and key parts of the order were struck down. Even though the FCC’s 
regulatory protection against content discrimination has been removed, the 
expectations by many of how content should be available online remains.  
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Network neutrality is tied to a blend of “technical, economic and civic 
meanings.”433 For some, the subject represents the threat of heavy-handed government 
regulation, while for others it is the path for cultivating a more open, democratic web. 
While norms supporting network neutrality may have helped shape current policy and 
markets, but without unified support from the larger public, those norms have proved 
no match compared to other forms of regulation.  
5.1.1 Why haven’t norms saved the net? 
Lessig argues norms established through subjective and objective terminology, 
shapes the social understanding of an issue and how it is and will be regulated.434 He 
notes, “Norms constrain an individual’s behavior, but not through the centralized 
enforcement of a state. If they constrain, they constrain because of the enforcement of a 
community. In the case of the internet, that community could potentially include 
billions. 
The decentralized and open nature of the internet makes identifying its 
underlying norms difficult if not impossible to identify. Instead, the internet is 
comprised of many networks and communities with many varying expectations and 
norms. Identifying the norms of network neutrality are also challenging, though many 
can be traced to the concept’s roots in common carriage. Despite the fact that much of 
discussion and advocacy surrounding network neutrality is driven by emotionality and 
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appeals to these normative values, much of the academic analysis has focused on its 
legal and policy measures or the market interactions between ISPs and CSPs.435  
Unlike the mechanisms of other modalities, norms rely on community for 
enforcement. As this chapter shows, the fragmented nature of the internet as a 
community has repeatedly been no match for more concentrated regulatory powers of 
markets, policies and architecture. In each of the following three cases, norms have 
played a significant role in the expectations and shaping of the network neutrality 
conversation, but have also failed to translate normative support to continuous 
behavior. 
In the case of common carriage, ancient norms of transportation and public use 
were removed from internet connections during a powerful trend of media 
concentration and deregulation. But despite this change, the common carriage norms 
underlying network neutrality have played a role in how NN continues to be 
addressed. Likewise, divided community norms of internet independence and 
openness have led to fragmented approaches to how those values should be preserved, 
thus weakening support for network neutrality policies. Finally, while international 
internet governance organizations have worked to assemble and establish norms of 
internet freedom and openness, these organizations have failed to establish or support 
explicit neutrality standards. In all three cases, community divisions have stood in the 
way of neutrality norms, thus allowing great influence from the other regulatory 
dimensions.   
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5.2 Common carriage as a norm 
While the term NN is a relatively new term, it follows a legacy of underlying 
principles supporting fair and open access to communication networks as well as 
content-neutral delivery of information with a history extending far into the past.436 
Common carriage has changed significantly over time. Noam argues that while 
common carriage is deeply associated with utilities and monopolies, it is not inherently 
linked to those concepts:  
Precursors to common carriage go back to the Roman Empire and the legal 
obligations of shipowners, innkeepers and stable keepers.4 In England early 
common law placed certain duties on businesses which were considered ‘public 
callings’. Common or public occupations included those of bakers, brewers, cab 
drivers, ferrymen, innkeepers, millers, smiths, surgeons, tailors and wharfingers.’ 
‘Common’ in that context meant ‘open to serving the general public’ or 
‘general’.437 
 
With the rise of capitalistic trade and economics, common carriage become more 
explicitly associated with transportation networks, but its ties to public service, 
particularly in its obligation to serve the public as a necessary passage for information 
without unnecessary discrimination continues today. As technologies changed, these 
laws naturally evolved to include railroads and forms of transportation before 
ultimately being applied to communications networks.  
Christian Sandvig notes that political scientist Ithiel de Sola Pool proposed 
expanding common carriage rules to new communication technologies, at a time when 
the internet was in its infancy.438 In his 1983 book Technologies of Freedom de Sola Pool 
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addresses this almost explicitly saying, “when resource constraints are severe and 
circumstances fit the historical situation of a common carrier, then norms exist.”439 
Those norms guide how that media form should be treated. He then outlines a series of 
policies to enshrine freedom in communication systems such as non-discrimination, 
prohibitions on monopoly abuse and minimally burdensome regulations.440 While de 
Sola Pool’s suggestions are policy solutions, they reflect a conscious observation of the 
normative expectations given to communication technologies. Just as they applied to 
the cable and telephone technologies primarily discussed in Technologies of Freedom, 
those same norms apply to the internet today.   
The last common carrier obligations were removed from internet connections in 
2002 by the FCC under Chairman Michael Powell. Despite a lack of formal rules, the 
public backlash against ISPs who discriminatory filtering and throttling indicated some 
community expectations of nondiscrimination for internet content remained.441 
Following these incidents and the election of an administration more sympathetic to 
these causes, the FCC’s 2010 Open Internet Order sought to preserve the norms of 
network neutrality through oversight regulation, rather than explicit legislation. The 
failed 2010 Open Internet Order can be understood as an attempt to preserve the norm 
of network neutrality despite strong industry pressure and with the support of only a 
fraction of the larger internet community.  
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The Verizon ruling showed that this attempt to codify the norms of neutrality 
without revisiting existing common carriage policies was an untenable position.442 
Crawford argues the FCC’s Verizon court loss is no surprise since the FCC “claimed, 
somehow, that it both repudiated the need for ‘common carriage’ rules and, at the same 
time, had the power to prevent discrimination by service providers” by using its power 
to reclassify broadband back to common carrier status.443 
In the public eye, the distinctions between “network neutrality,” “open internet,” 
and “common carriage,” continue to blur. Terms like “Open Internet” and “Network 
Neutrality” have become substitutes for talking about the principles outlined in 
common carrier rules.444 Many supporters endorse the normative features of common 
carriage being applied to broadband, regardless of whether or not the specific legal and 
market implications of legal reclassification may be difficult or even impossible to 
enforce.445  
The convergence of legacy media to a single internet platform has complicated 
these distinctions for network providers as well. For example, despite fiercely opposing 
to applying common carrier privileges for broadband, in 2014 Verizon reportedly took 
advantage of Title II common carrier privileges such as claiming utility right-of-way for 
constructing its fiber connections.446 The company then used those same fiber 
connections for its FTTP FiOS internet service. This action is technically legal, because 
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the company’s phone service travels through the same fiber as its broadband. Examples 
like these challenge both the practical and legal distinctions between these different 
technologies.  
5.2.1 Revisiting common carriage today 
The effects of reclassifying internet service as a common carrier are unknown 
and may depend on whether it is applied in principle or by the letter of the law. 
Skeptics have warned that internet data is far different from the telephone data Title II 
in the 1996 law was designed to regulate, and therefore it may be counterproductive if 
not altogether technologically impossible to regulate them using the same rules.447 
Despite these claims, the common carriage rules neutrality advocates seek have less to 
do with the technical and legal description, than the original principles of fair, 
reasonable and uninterrupted treatment of access to a public resource. As can be seen in 
the next section, that expectation has been driven in part by the norms independence 
and openness coded into the early internet, but mobilizing those norms in support of 
neutrality has proved to be quite difficult.  
5.3 Norming the net 
In part, the norms associated with the internet are not inherent to its 
construction, but instead grew with it. But even though neutrality advocates have 
worked to connect NN to values associated with the internet’s success, fragmentation 
within the larger internet using community over how those norms should be preserved 
has left the issue more susceptible to influence from political and economic powers.  
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These internet norms include concepts like decentralization, communitarianism, 
collaboration, transparency and open access.448 Castells suggests the early producers 
and users of internet technology have intentionally embedded these values and beliefs 
ingrained in the internet.449 He argues that the characteristics of several early internet 
groups including hackers, elites, communitarians and entrepreneurs who have 
ingrained in internet culture tendencies toward independence, decentralization, and 
collaboration.450  
While these norms have been long included in discussion about internet culture, 
they have also been mobilized in defense neutrality. Examining some of the values 
embedded within discussions of the internet offer a deeper perspective for 
understanding the role of norms in the network neutrality debate.451 McKelvey argues 
network neutrality further protect the values of the “open internet:”  
In actuality, a network neutrality principle makes a political stand by preserving 
the generative, perhaps radical democratic, aspects of the Internet. Participatory 
culture, social media, citizen journalism, and the creative commons depend on 
users being able to upload, broadcast, and share freely. Peers are the productive 
ends of the network.452 
 
Conversely, neutrality advocates have used the values associated with the 
internet as a tool for popularizing the concept. Kimball observes that the principles 
behind NN gained more support when connected to the rhetoric of “internet freedom” 
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and “open internet” initiatives compared the more technical and confusing “network 
neutrality.”453    
5.3.1 An open web  
Open internet advocates say the web is a powerful democratizing, and 
community-building force and non-discrimination is an important aspect of preserving 
widespread access. The Internet has been described as the world’s largest public 
commons.454 The web is depicted as a place where online producers who create content 
are also often the users who consume it.455 Non-discrimination standards like NN  
preserve the values of free speech and public discussion online.456 Because of the 
internet’s growing role as a vital information conduit, Nunziato argues broadband 
providers increasingly should follow the normative standard (if not yet legal 
compulsion) to serve as an unfiltered conduit for communication and to avoid 
prioritizing or discriminating against any legal forms of speech.457 Guaranteeing un-
filtered access preserves of the internet’s role as a valuable public forum:  
As a conduit for information in this public forum for expression, broadband 
providers should be prohibited from engaging in bias and allowing dominant 
content or application providers to lock in their dominant positions and lock out 
disfavored content or applications.458  
 
Senator Al Franken of Minnesota, one of the most vocal supports of network 
neutrality in the US congress, argued the maintaining network neutrality “ is absolutely 
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the First Amendment issue of our time.”459 Without content non-discrimination, 
journalism online (increasingly the dominant place for news consumption) may become 
cost prohibitive or subject to censorship from network operators. 460 Turilli, Vaccaro and 
Taddeo argue NN supporters have had success in framing neutrality as an ethical 
necessity for preserving access and fairness online.461  They argue network neutrality 
position stems from a desire to enforce fairness across the Internet.  
Fairness and access online may only be possible if trust and transparency are 
created between users and network operators. In a 2008 interview, open source 
software pioneer, Richard Stallman said he had no opposition to minor network 
management measures, but objected to ISP privileging some sites over others, which he 
described as “dishonest.”462 Benkler echoes this sentiment, suggesting the combination 
of transparent interactions and participation has helped make the web a revolutionary 
space for cultural production.463 
Collaboration and cooperation has become a hallmark characteristic of the “open 
internet” as well. As a vocal supporter of open access and the benefits of collaborative 
networks, Benkler has emphasized the value of norms and practices like open access, 
peer production and collaborative innovation.464 Expectations of open access to the web 
and collaborative technologies are in part a vestige of the free, openly-available 
protocols and systems like TCP/IP and WWW upon which much of the internet has 
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been built.465 The availability of these technologies allowed for the creation of a larger, 
unified web. Marsden argues neutrality preserves that ability to expand the community 
of the web:  
The open Internet is a commons for all to enjoy. That is the basis for claims that it 
should be preserved and regulation induced to prevent any more enclosure of 
that commons, while at the same time ensuring that the commons is not ruined 
by free-riders – that there is no ‘tragedy of the commons’. The open Internet is by 
no means the only or necessarily the most important place for public opinion to 
be formed, but it is the open public space that gives legitimacy to all these private 
or semi-private spaces.466  
 
 While the normative strains of openness and collaboration are significant 
parts of what’s described as “internet culture,” there is also a strong emphasis on 
independence and community solutions. 
5.3.2 A free web 
The idea of “internet freedom” has become a particularly contentious issue in 
internet governance, making the formation of a larger consensus regarding network 
neutrality more difficult. Many of the concepts associated with “Internet freedom” are 
described in the influential cyberlibertarian (and former Grateful Dead lyricist) John 
Perry Barlow’s “Declaration of Independence of the Independence of Cyberspace” in 
which he describes the Web as a new space outside of the industrial, geographical and 
political borders of the physical world.467  Barlow acknowledges the many unspoken 
social understanding of online culture: 
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You have not engaged in our great and gathering conversation, nor did you 
create the wealth of our marketplaces. You do not know our culture, our ethics, 
or the unwritten codes that already provide our society more order than could be 
obtained by any of your impositions.468 
 
This is an extension of the independent-minded and libertarian strains which 
continue to emerge in tech circles, particularly in those suspicious additional 
government or corporate involvement in Internet policy.469 An extreme of this 
perspective as described by Thierer eschews network neutrality as a communitarian 
principle that puts an undue burden on network operators and potentially forestalls the 
development of future internet features.470  
In the past, “internet freedom” has been used by neutrality proponents to 
describe the cause of freedom from content discrimination, as protection form state 
intervention and censorship online.471 But in the wake of the 2014 Verizon ruling, 
neutrality opponents have adopted argued further FCC rules to “regulate the internet” 
would endanger “internet freedom.”472  
5.3.3 Preserving access and independence: a split in norms  
Reconciling these sometimes conflicting beliefs with the history and structure of 
the internet offer a difficult challenge. While some believe the web is free, but that 
freedom is neither inherent nor permanent. While there may be a legacy of 
independence and libertarian views associated with the internet, at its extreme this 
                                                468	  Ibid.	  469	  Turner,	  From	  Counterculture	  to	  Cyberculture.	  470	  Thierer	  and	  Szoka,	  “Cyber-­‐Libertarianism.”	  471	  Morozov,	  “Passing	  Through”;	  Kimball,	  “What	  We	  Talk	  about	  When	  We	  Talk	  about	  Net	  Neutrality:	  A	  Historical	  Genealogy	  of	  the	  Discourse	  of	  ‘Net	  Neutrality’”;	  Cramer,	  “The	  Two	  Internet	  Freedoms.”	  472	  Cramer,	  “The	  Two	  Internet	  Freedoms.”	  
135 
view fails to fully acknowledge the strong role institutions have played in cultivating, 
monitoring and constructing the modern network of networks, its standards and 
practices.473 As shown in previous chapters, the development and expansion of the 
internet, comes not from its independent development, but instead was built with the 
aid of governmental, academic and corporate institutions.  
The norms of network neutrality seek to strike a balance between these 
competing interests: on the one hand, the internet’s success is in part due to its reliance 
on wide-scale adoption made possible by the participation of external design and 
investment, on the other hand, intervention by those institutions which limits 
participation online reduces the value of the network as a whole. Thus, a troubling 
paradox reveals the extent to which “open internet” and neutrality are often associated, 
but not inherently tied: free internet advocates support an unregulated and 
independent internet, yet regulation may be necessary to secure that same 
independence. Designer of the World Wide Web system, Tim Berners-Lee has voiced 
the need to reconcile these the competing views of internet openness and internet 
independence for the sake of preserving access to democracy, knowledge, and free 
speech online.474 He argues may be the best way to preserve the norms of neutrality:  
Yes, regulation to keep the Internet open is regulation. And mostly, the Internet 
thrives on lack of regulation. But some basic values have to be preserved. For 
example, the market system depends on the rule that you can't photocopy 
money. Democracy depends on freedom of speech. Freedom of connection, with 
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any application, to any party, is the fundamental social basis of the Internet, and, 
now, the society based on it.475 
 
Without consensus from the wider internet community to preserve these values 
through norms, regulatory action may be one of the few options remaining.  
5.4 Stakeholders and governance  
In part, translating these norms and values into policy has been the goal of 
international internet governance groups, however the widely-varying agendas of 
participants and unclear goals have proven these groups to be ineffective in articulating 
any clear consensus regarding network neutrality.  The failure to find common ground 
regarding basic standards of access online potentially endangers the larger global 
internet system. At worst, failure to find common ground regarding NN may lead 
conflicting approaches to internet service of the web and ultimately a “federated 
internet.”476 A balkanization of the internet into connected factions would prove a 
barrier to the global flows of information that has typified the internet’s growth.477 To 
combat the threat of a globally divided web and preserve the positive network effects of 
a globally-connected internet user base, many organizations including governments, 
international governing bodies and civil society groups continue to seek common 
ground for consistent, global internet standards. But despite ongoing nods and 
statements supporting openness, access and interest freedom from  
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5.4.1 Promise and peril of global internet governance  
Through the Internet’s history, its global standards have been created from a 
patchwork of interested groups including technology advocates, government regulators 
and corporate interests. Non-governmental organizations such as the International 
Corporation for the Assigning of Names and Numbers (ICANN), Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF), the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), the Internet Governance 
Forum (IGF) have played a particularly significant role in making technical decisions 
such as the process for top-level domain names and key technological upgrades.478 
These organizations work to develop governing principles through collaboration of 
interested parties and participants.479  
While states have traditionally crafted their own media policies, these key NGOs 
have taken an active role in events discussing the future of internet governance, 
particularly by their participation in multistakeholder events in which national 
representatives, NGOs, corporate representatives and members of civil society (like 
academics) participate.480 Theoretically, these “stakeholders” would participating in 
meetings and discussion panels, working together to find common ground on issues 
like standard-setting for protocols, website naming processes, privacy expectations, and 
other governance issues such as network neutrality.  
The inclusion of civil society groups, like the previously-mentioned NGOs may 
indicate an acknowledgement of the public interest in internet governance and be more 
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vocal in their support of network neutrality.481 However, many of the most prominent 
civil society groups involved in these discussions often have strong ties to US private 
sector corporations, and thus may not speak for the larger public interest.482  
Some participants in these events have become particularly vocal in supporting 
network neutrality during these global talks. The Internet Society (ISOC), one of the 
oldest Internet policy NGOs (and co-founded by Cerf,) has taken a strong position in 
supporting network neutrality with an emphasis on keeping Internet “open” or 
unrestricted.483 In a 2010 interview, ISOC head Jon McNearey emphasized the 
organization’s support of NN with an emphasis on its benefits to business innovation – 
linking the concepts of Internet “freedom” with its benefits to commerce.484 
The most significant events of international governance come from policy 
statements created during global conference events. The composition of these events 
significantly affects the policies agreed upon, though none have explicitly endorsed 
network neutrality and some have taken marked steps toward more content 
discrimination rather than less.  
For example, the 2003 and 2005 World Summits on Information and Society 
(WSIS) resulted in nominal proposals for internet governance, but little change.485 Each 
noted the importance of access to information technologies, freedom of expression and 
the ITU has attempted to expand its role in policy and standard-setting decisions. At the 
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ITU’s World Conference on International Telecommunications private, civil society 
groups and NGOs may participate, but only nations are allowed to vote on policy 
outcomes. Recently, the ITU made gestures toward taking a more active role in Internet 
governance, including recommending potentially non-network neutral policies under 
the auspices of greater network management power for participating countries at its 
2012 meeting.486 At that event the majority of countries participating in the event voiced 
support for great ITU involvement in internet governance and the non-neutral practices 
it initially proposed.487  These moves to make the web less neutral were roundly 
criticized by the US and others for potentially limiting expression and commerce 
online.488 
International indecision regarding network neutrality continued at the April 2014 
NETmundial event which allowed all multistakeholder groups to participate in the 
creation of its policy declarations.489 Prior to the event, the host country of Brazil passed 
as sweeping Internet bill of rights including nods to added privacy and neutrality.490  
Because of that, along with a more inclusive participation groups, the event appeared 
set to outline more specific statements regarding network neutrality internationally. 
While the NETmundial concluding statement includes nods to internet openness, 
freedom of speech and other norms associated with the web, the document proposes 
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universal, opportunity and access, rather than explicit network neutrality.491 Critics say 
this milquetoast response is equally due to both the slow, majoritarian multistakeholder 
process as well as the powerful corporate voice in these deliberations.492  
The extent to which Internet governance will ever truly be a multistakeholder 
endeavor remains unknown and the prospects for consensus around network neutrality 
appears to be slim. Though As Goldsmith and Wu have noted, the US’s powerful 
influence in web protocol decisions and its influence the participants of these debates 
should not be understated.493 While no firm neutrality policies have emerged from these 
meetings, the proposals emerging from WSIS, WCIT and NETmundial show potentially 
diverging trajectories regarding the issue.  
International internet governance deliberations holds the promise of setting 
standards for an increasingly inclusive and global internet, but the weakness of these 
international declarations and the influence of already powerful corporations and 
governments remain an enormous barrier to the success of international 
multistakeholder events. While thus far these events have made gestures toward the 
norms and values of network neutrality like open access to technology, freedom to 
connect online, and freedom from targeted discrimination, these statements have 
remained incredibly vague.  
In the last ten years, global governance events have more openly involved 
representatives from non-national groups like corporations, NGOs and civil society 
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participants. At the same time, the policies outlined in meetings like the ITU’s WCIT 
have become increasingly less sympathetic to the normative concepts underlying 
network neutrality. This may be in part because of the composition of voting parties. It 
appears that events with increased participation from multistakeholder groups civil 
society groups and NGOs (like NETMundial and WSIS) in level of participation 
resulted in stronger values linked to the principles of network neutrality, and 
investigating this offers many opportunities for future studies. Nonetheless, despite 
multiple policy statements from multistakeholder and international events gesturing 
toward network neutrality norms, as of this document’s publication none have 
explicitly supported network neutrality and there appears to be less community 
consensus regarding the basic aspects of internet governance, let alone clear support for 
NN. 
5.5 Conclusion: Is the public awake?  
 Today, both entertainment and activism travel across the same networks. 
The norms of network neutrality have established to users that both light entertainment 
and life-or-death matters can be shared equally and reliably. Users generally expect a 
similar level of service whether looking up the humorous online feline Grumpy Cat, 
news of civil wars and international conflicts, or organizing a political protest.494 And in 
fact, more often the popularity of these networks as sources for news and entertainment 
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allow for political speech in places that would otherwise be censored.495 Major shifts in 
how the internet is governed and perceived, such the current network neutrality 
upheaval or the 2013 NSA online spying revelations, potentially undermine trust 
online.496 
The internet has been lauded for its ability to recentralize the voice of the public 
and recently some users have been mobilized to participate in the rules that govern the 
internet itself. In 2012, internet companies and users reacted to a series of bills proposed 
to more heavily enforce intellectual property laws online with a massive campaign of 
letter-writing, emails and website blackouts.497 These efforts were in part reinforced by 
online content companies like Google that could be materially affected by the laws, the 
public outcry, however, did not appear to be spurred by web companies alone.498 
In the case of NN the amount of public support is less clear. In part, this may be 
because of the opacity of the concept’s technical and legal background. A 2014 Pew 
report examining the issue noted that network neutrality debate has been sporadically 
covered in traditional television and newspaper press.499 The study showed between 
January and May 2014, network neutrality was addressed in only 25 of the over 2,800 
television news programs directly addressed network neutrality. It also showed that the 
lion’s share of neutrality coverage in print appeared in only six newspapers. While the 
Pew report noted that interest in Twitter and in Google searches appeared to be much 
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more active, the subject continues to occupy a relatively slim niche. A 2010 focus group 
study by Quail and Larabie suggests that sporadic and incomplete coverage of the 
network neutrality issue may lead to a lack of knowledge regarding the complex history 
and implications of the issue for the larger public.500 But there may be reason to believe 
interest in network neutrality growing. 
5.5.1 Verizon ruling aftermath 
In the wake of the 2014 Verizon ruling, the gears of public internet governance 
activism appear to be moving once again. Spurred by calls from open internet advocacy 
groups and wider mainstream coverage of the usually banal subject of 
telecommunications policy, there may be signs of a renewed public interest in network 
neutrality.501 The FCC’s proposed rule revisions suggesting ISPs be allowed to create 
separate, premium-service “fast lanes” sparked a wave of concern that the norms of 
network neutrality had been forsaken by the only government agency with power to 
preserve them.502 FCC chairman Wheeler later removed the “fast lanes” provision of the 
proposal in response the wave of public outcry.503 As the public comment period for the 
FCC’s revised rules continued, pro-neutrality activists and organizations have camped 
in front of the FCC’s offices,504 protested outside of ongoing FCC hearings,505 and 
signed petitions supporting the preservation of network neutral policies.506  
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News and entertainment coverage has also raised the profile of the issue. One 
notable example, a 14-minute segment on the HBO comedy/news show Last Week 
tonight with John Oliver, gained wide attention for its clear, but humorous take on the 
issue.507 In the segment, Oliver rails against the FCC’s regulatory process, the powerful 
influence of the cable industry, and the lack of broadband competition.508 Oliver argues,  
The cable companies have figured out a great truth of America: if you want to do 
something evil, put it in something boring. …that’s why advocates should not be 
talking about protecting net neutrality, they shouldn’t even use that phrase. They 
should call it ‘preventing cable company f--kery.’509 
 
The video prompted a wave of attention and responses from the public. During 
this period the site was briefly hacked which temporarily disabled the commission’s 
nearly 20-year-old commenting system.510 Despite website delays, the FCC’s public 
comment website was flooded with over 45,000 comments in two days following the 
segment’s original airing.511 Since its initial posting on June 1, 2014 the video has 
received over 4.6 million views on YouTube.512 In the 60-day comment period, the FCC 
reportedly received over 1.1 million public comments regarding the commission’s 
proposed open internet rules.513 These responses ranged from the profane to the 
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insightful, with about half coming from commenters themselves (rather than form 
letters.)514 While the outcome of the FCC’s rules revision remain unclear at publication, 
the enormous response to the issue may be a sign that the public is tuning in.  
5.5.2 If not norms?  
Discussing the parameters of network neutrality in terms of economics or 
technology is complex – the technicalities and ambiguities of maintaining, enforcing or 
removing systematic content neutrality cross many different systems with dramatically 
different needs may be nearly impossible. By comparison, norms may appear far more 
easily understood, but that has not made them more effective. Just as the protocols, 
regulations and market interactions have shaped the norms of neutrality and the 
internet – they have the power to erode them. The ideals of openness and independence 
are deeply embedded within today’s NN debate. Without a united, informed 
community consensus regarding the issue norms lack the power to regulate. Instead, 
the principles of non-discrimination and public access to the web may be more securely 
preserved by through policy action instead. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
This concluding chapter includes summaries of the key elements uncovered in 
this project and propose a series of policy recommendations based on its findings. It 
highlights the key contributions and effects of architecture, markets and norms on 
network neutrality regulation on US policy. It acknowledges the challenges of 
expanding network neutrality internationally and offers a series of policy 
recommendations based on the findings of this project’s comparative case studies. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of this project’s limitations and offers 
suggestions for how future projects may expand on its findings. 
6.1 An uncertain future 
The 2014 Verizon ruling was only the most recent in a series of ongoing 
skirmishes over network neutrality in the US.  While nominally the debate is between 
network operators and regulators, it has implications for how information is owned, 
created, and distributed in an interconnected world. The power to distribute, 
manipulate and wield information has been incredibly valuable.515 The terms and 
conditions upon which this information is moved (or blocked) may have serious 
economic, social and political ramifications. This multi-modal examination of network 
neutrality was conducted with these considerations in mind. 
Information carriage is incredibly important, yet sometimes invisible. As 
globally-connected digital communication becomes an increasingly significant part of 
daily life and commerce, this is truer than ever. The regulations dictating how 
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information travels the web impacts the news we read, the entertainment we enjoy, the 
communities we interact with, and the choices we make. Lessig’s four modalities (laws, 
architecture, markets, and norms) have provided a way to unpack these regulations by 
isolating them while also contextualizing them in relation to each other.516 In the case of 
network neutrality, this means examining the ongoing influences of technological 
changes, economic conditions, public beliefs, and policies that have shaped how 
information moves online.  
This project began with the following two research questions:  
RQ1: How have laws, norms, architecture, and markets each contributed to the current NN 
regulatory framework in the US?  
 
RQ2: How can the policy responses to market, architecture, and normative regulation of NN 
in select international case studies inform future network neutrality policy in the US? 
 
In answering them, the previous chapters have offered a series of comparative 
case studies examining a wide range of subjects in pursuit of unpacking their 
relationship to the current network neutrality conditions. These examinations of how 
architecture, markets, norms have affected network neutrality regulation and policy in 
the US suggest a fascinating and complex web of rules, habits and customs.  
6.2 Failure on multiple levels 
In analyzing these modalities in relation to network neutrality, it is glaringly 
clear how intertwined they truly are. Architecture, markets, norms, and policy have 
played a part in the reinforcement of network neutrality. No single aspect of Internet 
regulation has been able to thoroughly protect the principles of equal access and 
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content non-discrimination. At some point each principle of network neutrality has 
fallen victim to ongoing systematic failures, regulatory short-sightedness and 
sometimes deliberate undermining by powerful network owners and operators.  
Following the stripping of common carrier obligations from US broadband 
carriers in the early 2000s and the institution of a handful small FCC policy measures, 
US network neutrality policy has increasingly depended on architecture, markets, and 
norms to preserve the principles of content non-discrimination and access. As the 
internet becomes increasingly significant to all aspects of life and commerce, the 
weakening of network neutrality threatens to mortgage the networks long-term 
potential in exchange for short-term gains. This project highlights the fragility of each of 
those modalities both in the US and abroad as well as the need for more robust network 
neutrality policy. Each of the modalities offers potential for creating a more neutral 
web, but as the previous chapters have also shown, each is also susceptible to coercion, 
corruption, and division. 
6.2.1 Architecture 
The architecture of the internet is both complex and steadily evolving. As Lessig 
has argued, architecture is a created through its designer’s choices and the web users 
know today is as much a result of its initial design protocols as the newest technologies 
used to manage it.517 Not surprisingly, the internet of today is far different from its 
origins as ARPANET. However some key elements such as its end-to-end design and 
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the TCP/IP protocols that have remained a significant part of the internet’s structure.518 
But these protocols are not the only ones important to the internet’s structure.  While 
new protocols have made it possible to transfer data at speeds and quality levels its 
creators could not have imagined.  
Today’s web is used for far more than basic text and email. Media of all types — 
from telephone and video — are all being carried out across the network of networks 
and these diverse media sometimes require drastically different technologies to 
function. Increasingly sophisticated network management technologies have also made 
it possible for network owners to manage this convergence, but they have also 
developed the tools to identify, prioritize and potentially slow or block specific types of 
content. 
Lessig famously declared that “Code is law” – but that law is not fate. 
Architecture is often adopted, adapted, modified, or discarded. Some have claimed 
high-capacity, high-speed fiber networks and technologies off a potential breakthrough 
for creating non-discriminatory networks.519 But in the cases of Australia and New 
Zealand, these have so far not been the case. Even though both countries continue to 
invest billions of dollars into constructing publically-owned, unbundled infrastructures, 
these measures have done very little foster an atmosphere more favorable to network 
neutrality. While these new infrastructures may create a more competitive market for 
internet service, existing network policies allowing data caps and content throttling 
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remain. However, the persistence of discrimination in Australia and New Zealand 
despite increased bandwidth across publically funded networks undercuts the claim by 
US network owners that usage charges and limits are necessary to fund network 
improvements.    
6.2.2 Markets 
For some time the network neutrality debate appeared to be a duel between 
content providers and networks with users and CSPs uploading and downloading 
increasingly large volumes of data and IPSs and network owners seeking more tools for 
managing traffic and recouping the costs of network management. But increasingly 
these divisions have become further fragmented.  
As the largest ISPs and CSPs grow, their influence and power increasingly 
distorts both the internet economy and the balance of power regarding network 
neutrality. Network providers have long sought the tools to further capitalize on their 
powerful position as content gatekeepers and the convergence of content onto the 
Internet has only increased their power. The largest content providers – with both 
millions (sometimes billions) of users and billions of dollars, have the clout to negotiate 
favorable agreements with networks, while smaller content providers have much less 
leverage when negotiating agreements like peering and interconnection.  
Vertical integration, high-profile mergers, and acquisitions of content producers 
by network owners and the expansion of CSPs like Google into the development of 
fiber infrastructure allows these corporations to gain further economic advantages with 
or without neutrality. These vertical mergers have given the most powerful players in 
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the internet markets even more profits and less competition.520  With little support for 
blocking these integrations, regulators like the FCC have traded short-term neutrality 
agreements in exchange for approving mega-mergers like the one between Comcast 
and NBCUniversal. Under the banners of deregulation and free markets, regulators and 
legislators have allowed (and sometimes) aided this concentration of media powers. 
Proponents have argued network neutrality offers some of the last remaining tools for 
checking the power of gatekeeper network operators.  
This stands in contrast to the market system used throughout the EU where 
markets have played a more central role in the Internet regulation. A conscious 
separation of ISPs from network ownership (known as unbundling) has resulted in 
more competitive markets for internet service and potentially less incentive for ISPs to 
slow or block certain types of content. While some countries like the Netherlands have 
been on the vanguard of instituting pro-neutrality regulations, broadband in the EU is 
far from perfect.521 Recently threats of content censorship have come not from corporate 
actors, but from laws and policies seeking to strike a balance between online 
information, privacy, and public norms.522  
The broadband markets in the EU and elsewhere are the result of a different 
history and different policies than those in the US. Many European systems are partially 
the result of formerly state-constructed, centralized broadband and telecommunications 
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networks, which are far different than the patchwork of private systems.523 Instead, 
much of the US policymaking regarding network neutrality has been debated on 
economic grounds, and often centering on its potential to help or harm innovation and 
competition.524 This has shaped network neutrality’s meaning and implications for the 
culture at large. 
6.2.3 Norms 
The effect of norms on network neutrality is one of the least traceable aspects 
shaping non-discrimination regulation, yet it may potentially be the most important. 
Normative regulation relies on the community support for enforcement. Wider support 
means stronger normative rules, divided support means less powerful norms.  The 
strength of the norms underlying network neutrality like non-discrimination and equal 
access to public resources have seen mixed support. These norms were first seen in the 
ancient laws of common carriage, which protected good, and passengers have been 
passed down from carriages and railroads to the communications technologies of today.  
But despite their long history, policies reflecting those norms are far from a 
given. As was seen with the creation of the FCC’s Cable Internet Order, policy choices 
and other norms (like deregulation) may overtake previous norms. However, the 
ongoing persistence of the network neutrality debate may be an indication that these 
norms have not disappeared, but instead taken a back seat to more powerful policy 
influencers. 
                                                523	  Eli	  M.	  Noam,	  “Regulation	  3.0	  for	  Telecom	  3.0.”	  524	  Quail	  and	  Larabie,	  “Net	  Neutrality.”	  
153 
The internet has not only been associated with the values of democracy, 
community but also independence from oversight. In part, the division between the 
meanings and values associated with the “free internet” and “open internet” may have 
held back the larger a wider community of internet users from supporting network 
neutrality. While politicians and activists have attempted to mobilize the term “open 
internet” as a euphemism for NN, the effectiveness of this to translate into wider policy 
change appears inconclusive.525  
The extent to which these norms can be fashioned into functional and scalable 
policy remains up for debate. The issue has received notable attention at several 
international multistakeholder meetings, but beyond lip service to “internet openness” 
little has been done. Neutrality policies have been enacted in other countries like the 
Netherlands (and temporarily enforced in the US) but, to reap the larger network effects 
of a global web, protections against discrimination must ultimately extend beyond the 
handful of most progressive countries.  
Norms depend on wider community support to exist and thus are often flexible 
and fleeting. A united public support for neutrality principles may yield greater 
attention to these issues and reinforce the value of access and content non-
discrimination. Conversely, the systematic weakening of network neutrality rules not 
only gives network gatekeepers greater power in the short-run, it also potentially 
weakens the ideals of democracy, communitarianism, and independence associated 
with the internet.  
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6.3 Many approaches, in the US and abroad 
In the US, each of these aspects has affected the network neutrality debate and its 
future. In the last decade, FCC policies have both helped and sometimes hurt the cause 
of open access and content non-discrimination online. Some decisions like the Cable 
Internet Order created significant setbacks for neutrality, while nominally promoting 
network expansion. Others like the 2010 Open Internet Order have nominally 
supported neutrality, but appear to have largely maintained the status quo from 
increasingly powerful network operators. Legal decisions like the 2014 Verizon ruling 
have made the FCC’s position of supporting neutrality increasingly difficult.  
Each country’s unique history affords them different opportunities and 
challenges for developing internet policies in general and neutrality regulations 
specifically. While discussions about open Internet policies are happening all over the 
world, neutrality policies are instituted unequally. Several European countries, 
including the Netherlands, have passed strong neutrality laws.526 Some regions, like the 
European Union have crafted market-oriented policies seeking to reduce discrimination 
through competition.527 However, many countries have no expectation and no near-
term prospects for content neutrality online.528 Others, like China have instituted highly 
institutionalized and powerful political censorship mechanisms into the internet 
infrastructure itself.529   
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Because of these inequalities, the expectations of network neutrality vary greatly. 
Like the US concept of free speech, neutrality has potential benefits but also unforeseen 
consequences across cultures. These disagreements have stood in the way of creating a 
wider community consensus behind non-discrimination norms making US and 
international governance regarding the issue particularly complex and often ineffective. 
Today, there is no “one size fits all” network neutrality rule that can work around the 
world.  
6.4 Policy considerations and recommendations 
Some have argued for a balanced approach to broadband network 
discrimination that acknowledges the potential abuses by network providers as well as 
recognizing acceptable conditions for network management.530 This would require a 
large degree of transparency and trust on behalf of all parties involved. The existing 
policies of NN have been constructed through an amalgamation of laws, stakeholder 
relationships and technological developments. The normative values upon which the 
NN debate takes place have been established through the historical emergence of the 
issue as well as the cultural and evaluative perspectives of the values associated with 
the global information networking.   
One side effect of the 2014 Verizon ruling was a legal reinforcement of the FCC’s 
jurisdiction to regulate the internet – a power with some open internet advocates have 
warned may set a bad precedent for the agency’s ability to interfere with the web in the 
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future.531 This balance of neutrality norms means balancing the public’s desire for 
robust regulation of powerful network operators, while also reassuring suspicions of 
government overreach online.  
With this tension in mind, Marsden has argued for a co-regulatory or self-
regulatory standard in which stakeholders (ISPs, CSPs, NGOs, and governments) agree 
to enforce a normative standard for non-discrimination.532 With the exception of some 
abuses, this has largely been the status quo in the US. The FCC’s 2010 Open Internet 
Order nominally enforced standards supporting NN with some flexibility for network 
QoS, tiered pricing and interconnection negotiations. In the co-regulatory model, 
networks would be discouraged from closed or discriminatory behavior for fear of 
market reactions and public outcry.  
Co-regulation and self-regulation may offer an acceptable approach to 
promoting neutrality without onerous regulations, but it may not be effective in all 
situations. In the EU where regulations must be applied across many different national 
infrastructures and ISP competition is more robust because of unbundling, co-
regulation may offer a way to establish more general, common-ground principles for 
internet governance. However, in the US network owners and ISPs are often the same 
and competition is less robust, this option seems more susceptible to manipulation and 
inefficiency. 
Following Verizon’s successful legal challenge, the FCC’s authority to regulate 
internet communication was reaffirmed, but the agency has exhausted nearly all 
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options short of reclassification for preserving network neutrality. Some have argued 
that content and pricing discrimination may be better challenged on antitrust grounds 
by agencies like the Federal Trade Commission or Justice Department, particularly as 
network providers increasingly merge and vertically integrate.533 While the FCC has 
made broadband network neutrality a stipulation of several large telecommunications 
mergers, these stipulations are only temporary a solution to long-term problems.  
6.4.1 Political landscape for network neutrality today 
Political change is unpredictable. As chapter two showed, the policy history of 
network neutrality in the US is marked by unexpected successes, remarkable failures, 
incremental developments and rapid shifts in political and social momentum. 
Legislation and legal decisions often have significant and unexpected results – the 
recent Verizon decision is just the most recent example. With these reservations, the 
following policy recommendations attempt to take into consideration the current 
political and regulatory environment for internet regulation in the US.  
Clear legislative policies supporting network neutrality appear less likely in 
the short-term. Though a handful of neutrality-relevant bills (both for and against) have 
been suggested following the 2014 Verizon ruling, these appear to be largely political 
gestures.534 While US President Barack Obama has expressed support for network 
neutrality and other “open internet” policies, the President’s support has not 
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translated into robust political action since at least 2010.535 In part, the lack of more 
political attention to the issue (from both the legislative and executive branches) may be 
due to the telecommunications industry’s sizable lobbying and campaign donations.536 
This has raised concerns about regulatory capture and a “revolving door” regarding 
telecommunications oversight in general, extending to the FCC. This was particularly 
apparent with the appointment of FCC chair Wheeler, a former lobbyist for the telecom 
industry.537  
6.4.2 Network Neutrality policy proposals 
Just as the symptoms span all four modalities, so should the treatments. The 
following recommendations are informed by this projects analysis of the US approaches 
and regulation of network neutrality, along with comparative examinations of each 
chapter’s international case study. They range from minor oversight suggestions such 
as improved merger and transparency oversight to instituting a separations principle 
that would result in a wholesale restructuring of the US media and broadband industry. 
While it is conceivable that all or none of these proposals are translated into law, they 
each offer elements that would promote a more net neutral and non-discriminatory 
web. 
Recommendation 1: Robust transparency enforcement 
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Initial transparency and reporting requirements instituted in the 2010 Open 
Internet Order should be preserved and potentially expanded. If policymakers were to 
require monitoring and reporting of internet speeds from both users and content 
providers, it may create an atmosphere of greater transparency regarding internet 
distribution. While there are technological factors (such as the testing services which 
sometimes report drastically different results,) efforts to monitor and report results offer 
one of the few options for keeping ISPs and networks accountable to the public.538  
Unfortunately, transparency is vague and hard to assess by regulators. For 
instance, despite EU policies calling for greater traffic management transparency, the 
2012 EU investigation revealed widespread ISP throttling and other discriminatory 
practices.539 Unless regulators ensure transparency requirements are measurable and 
consistently enforced, they may not be particularly successful in fostering an 
atmosphere of non-discrimination. But transparency should also extend beyond traffic 
management to the increasingly significant practice of ISP interconnection agreements 
that lie in a NN gray area.  
Recently, the public conflict between Netflix and Verizon (and to a lesser extent 
Comcast) has revealed many of the more complex negotiations between CSPs, backbone 
and last-mile providers. The FCC’s announced investigation into interconnection and 
peering agreements is hopefully a first step toward more scrutiny of this increasingly 
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vital, but underreported aspect of the internet ecosystem.540 A clearer, more 
understanding of these relationships by the public may potentially highlight the need 
for more established rules and principles guiding Internet carriage in general.  
Transparency has been included in the FCC’s revised 2014 rules proposition and 
may be the most likely of any proposed neutrality rules. Strong transparency, if 
properly executed and enforced, may offer the public a more informed position 
regarding internet architecture, traffic management, and potentially levels the market 
negotiations between users, CSPs and ISPs. 
Recommendation 2: Heightened merger, acquisition and antitrust scrutiny 
Along with the cooperation of other regulatory organizations like the FTC and 
Justice Department, increased scrutiny should be placed on the mergers, acquisitions 
and competitive ecosystem of telecommunications corporations. While European-
style unbundling or separations policy would be one way to increase competition across 
broadband markets that does not appear possible in the US system without a large scale 
restructuring of the telecommunications sector in general. Also unlikely in the near-
term, is a wide-scale centralized re-construction and development of broadband 
systems, such as has been seen in Australia and New Zealand.  
The FCC’s application of network neutrality regulations to merger approvals is a 
notable example of applying stricter requirements to these business transactions. 
Another possibility is to use the treat of Title II reclassification as a negotiating lever for 
exacting greater transparency or competition guarantees from existing network 
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operators. The FCC should clarify and update its definition of broadband internet 
beyond the current 4 Mbps range.541 Currently, that low definition allows wired 
internet providers to list wireless and mobile phone providers as adequate competition 
– thus thwarting greater antitrust scrutiny. When wireless providers are not considered 
competition to wireline providers – the amount of competition is greatly reduced in 
most areas.542 
Finally, policymakers should continue to encourage the development of fiber 
and high-speed competition to the current Cable/DSL regime and fight legal 
restrictions banning the development of municipal fiber.543 The advent of extremely 
high-speed networks has the potential to greatly reduce the scarcity threat upon which 
most ISPs base content management and pricing discrimination.544 Advocates like 
Crawford have argued strongly for the further development of municipal fiber-to-the-
premises networks that offer services more in line with the public interest of those 
localities while also creating more competition for incumbent providers.545 
Recommendation 3: Reclassification in lieu of new internet-specific laws 
Because of their sometimes exclusive and often vital role in commercial and daily 
life private transportation networks have been held to common carriage standards for 
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hundreds of years.546 Today, the classification of broadband Internet service as an 
information service rather than a telecommunications service is the result of a political 
choice and the lack of an alternative between the two. The past 25 years of FCC internet 
policy have been marked by ongoing attempts to reconcile the needs of the modern web 
with the rules laid out in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 – a document designed 
for a different time and aging technologies.  
The initial division of computing versus voice transmission was conceived in the 
1970s as an attempt to prevent the AT&T monopoly from exerting too much control 
over that emerging field.547 Today, because of its classification as an information service, 
a similar threat has emerged – the potential for abuse by gatekeeper networks seeking 
to extract rent and market position thanks to their valuable role in the communications 
ecosystem. Just as in the 1970s, the classifications of today are not adequate for the 
growth of technology and the needs of the larger public.  
The 2014 Verizon case struck down aspects of the 2010 Open Internet Order that 
were too similar to Title II telecommunications, but did not deny the FCC’s power to 
reclassify broadband altogether.548 Many network neutrality supporters have argued 
reclassification to Title II is the clearest way forward to preserve the “open internet.”549 
                                                546	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Because of the prior court rulings, Crawford argues reclassification may be one of the 
only options left for the FCC use in preventing online content discrimination: 
Without the right administrative label applied to these services, every step the 
commission takes to address these problems will be subject to a protracted battle over 
whether the FCC is impermissibly treating the network providers as ‘common 
carriers.’550  
This approach would re-apply common carrier obligations to internet service in 
the US, however its unclear how the policy’s other restrictions would affect web service. 
Some (including the ISPs themselves) have argued common carrier rules would create 
onerous burdens on network operators and may be virtually impossible across internet 
systems – because of how data is transmitted.551 
One option available today would be for the FCC to reclassify internet service 
under the existing Title II telecommunications rules in the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996, but with selective forbearance.  This action would restore common carriage 
rules to internet service while selectively ignoring Title II’s most onerous 
requirements.552 Forbearance offers the benefits of Title II without the need to apply 
telephone-specific rules.553 McSherry argues: 
                                                550	  Crawford,	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So while we call on the FCC to do the right and sensible thing and reclassify, we 
must simultaneously demand that the FCC explicitly reject any 
telecommunications regulations beyond specific and narrow prohibitions and 
requirements designed to create a fair and level playing field for innovation and 
user choice. Without broad forbearance, reclassification can become a nightmare 
for users, innovators and service providers alike.554  
 
While FCC reclassification of broadband services is not highly likely in 2014, 
such an action would undoubtedly draw legal challenges from the major ISPs and 
create a protracted legal battle regarding the application of the 1996 
Telecommunications Laws. Until the case was decided this would allow for de-facto 
common carriage online until the reclassification was either successfully challenged by 
network operators or a new telecommunications law is passed.  
Recommendation 4: Incentivize network neutral practices 
Policymakers should examine possible avenues for incentivizing network 
owners and operators to operate using network neutral practices and minimally 
invasive network management tools. Gilroy notes that incentives of this nature have 
been recently attempted in the US as recently as in 2009.555 Network neutrality rules 
were included as requirements for grant recipients in two separate programs funded 
through the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.556 Future policy actions 
that might build on this practice include offering tax incentives or rebates for network 
operators conducting sufficiently net neutral practices. Similar incentives on the state 
and local level may also be effective, particularly in high-population areas like New 
York and California.  
                                                554	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Recommendation 5: Encourage broadband separation or unbundling  
Because of its unique regulatory history, the issue of common carriage and 
reclassification has been described as a uniquely “American problem.”557 The ubiquity 
of cable television along with telephone lines, both of which can serve as conduits for 
broadband traffic were leveraged by ISPs as rationale for shedding previous common 
carriage requirements.558 In Europe, this hasn’t been the case because households often 
only have access to a single broadband technology line and thus restrictions requiring 
unbundling or universal service access have remained.559As a measure to thwart the 
increasing reliance on only a few broadband providers, policymakers should consider 
forced separation of infrastructure and ISP ownership. While drastic, this separation 
would dissuade the conflicts-of-interest that may lead to anti-competitive, non-neutral 
treatment.  
Similarly, Wu’s “separations principle” would prohibit cross-ownership of CSPs, 
network ownership, or ISPs – while also prohibiting government interference or 
winner-choosing.560 He argues the preservation of competitive information markets and 
the public’s interest in the cultivation of the internet means regulators, led by the FCC, 
should play an active role in pursuing these ends.561 Grove and Baumann argue layer 
                                                557	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  Wu,	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separation would reduce inefficient investment by both ISPs and CSPs attempting to 
enter the other’s business domains.562 
Layer separations echoes the 1948 Supreme Court case U.S. v. Paramount Pictures 
Inc. in which the largest motion picture corporations (which owned content production, 
distribution and exhibition) were ordered to sell their interests in distribution and/or 
exhibition on the grounds that this level of ownership violated existing antitrust laws.563 
However, some have argued these “separations” approaches all rely on market forces, 
which alone may not provide the assurances needed for network neutrality.564 Even the 
1948 Paramount decision was thwarted by some studios, and eventually undermined by 
future deregulators.  
The EU’s network neutrality strategy has largely relied on a lighter version of 
this separations principle by encouraging the unbundling of ISPs from network 
infrastructure. Because of different infrastructures, business conditions and existing 
laws between European countries, these policies are an attempt to encourage 
broadband competition while disrupting existing structures as little as possible.  
As legacy media technologies continue to migrate to a single Internet Protocol 
platform, there may be a renewed call for policies like unbundling. In part, the US’s 
abandonment of common carrier regulation in the early 2000s was the availability of 
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multi-platform competition between cable and DSL, but if no viable competitor emerges 
for increasingly-available FTTP connections, there may be a need to restore common 
carrier-like policies.   
6.5 Neutrality for the future 
There’s an abundance of things to say about network neutrality, and this project has not 
claimed to say them all. Instead, it has offered an overview of the regulatory challenges and 
failures. The debate about NN is still ongoing. Rather than focusing in-depth on particular 
aspects of the issue, which has been thoroughly covered by Marsden, van Schewick, Crowcroft 
and others, this project instead has attempted to show the interactions and failures of multiple 
dimensions affecting NN. 565  
As this examination of network neutrality has underscored, the interactions between 
Lessig’s four modalities are complex and deeply linked. Aspects of policy, architecture, 
markets, and norms have each played important roles in shaping the regulation of network 
neutrality. But as this project has hopefully shown, the role and power of those modalities is 
often fluid. Changing norms can lead to market power and the creation of new policies. 
Architectural choices cultivate communities to adopt certain norms and dismiss others. Policy 
decisions outline architectures that constrain markets, and so on.   
6.5.1 Limitations and future projects 
There are many opportunities to expand and enhance research from both this project 
and about network neutrality in general. For instance, more detailed examinations of each 
modality with regards to network neutrality could offer more insights into their role in 
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regulating this issue. In his book Code (2006), Lessig explores many of the architectural 
conditions and structures of cyberspace, but other examinations of markets, norms and policy 
would be beneficial to the scholarship.566 Also, there is a need for additional network neutrality 
examinations that cross between the disciplines of law, engineering, media, sociology. Finally, 
this project examines and compares only four modalities, but as Lessig notes, there is room for 
other modalities of regulation and others could be argued for and analyzed.567  
While this project offers case studies that show contrasts between the US approach to 
neutrality and approaches elsewhere in the world, there is a need for more case studies 
examining how the specific conditions of internet and information governance are addressed 
throughout the world. As more countries have adopted network neutrality rules, there is room 
for more empirical testing of the effects of these policies including, but not limited to, speed 
comparisons, public surveys, etc. Additional comparative research projects may examine the 
history or lack of neutrality over time, between invested parties, and the effects of neutrality 
policy elsewhere beyond the US and western world.  
While network neutrality is a significant issue, it justifiably may receive far less attention 
in places where more basic resources are a priority. While network neutrality has been largely a 
concern for developed countries with widespread broadband access, its relevance to the digital 
divide and global communication access inequality should not be ignored.568 As broadband 
access is increasingly available throughout the world, the standards and rules of access and cost 
tied to network neutrality may be particularly important. For this reason, future studies of 
broadband and internet expansion throughout the world (rich and poor) should include 
examining the inclusion or exclusion of neutrality policies and practices.  
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6.5.2 An unknown future 
Network neutrality is only one of the most recent battles in a much more long-
term negotiation for how information is controlled and distributed. This legacy 
stretches as far back as civilization itself with control moving from one group to the 
next as culture, technology and needs change.569 The emergence of globally 
interconnected digital networks and the increasing convergence of previous media 
forms onto one space has brought many economic, social and political changes and the 
effect of these changes on society continue to be negotiated. The regulation of network 
neutrality offers an insight into one relatively small aspect of the larger internet 
ecosystem with potentially big implications for how information is owned, created and 
distributed.   
The regulation of an issue like network neutrality is not measured by specific 
policies, temporary economic relationships, inventive programming or fleeting beliefs, 
but by the culmination of these across time. The future of network neutrality remains 
unknown, but it is steered not by a single voice, idea, or event, but instead by the 
ongoing negotiation between multitudes of invested parties.  
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